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I. INTRODUCTION
What is the normative justification for workplace safety
regulation? The prevailing account, rooted in economic theory, is
that regulatory interventions in this field are justified only by
spillover and informational market failures.1 This article challenges
the prevailing account by contending that worker safety
regulations are also justified when they are necessary to enforce the
relational expectations of employees. If my contention is correct,
then it follows that the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the
Act) is justified by anti-opportunism—preventing employers from
engaging in opportunistic, self-interested behavior that runs
contrary to the principles of the relational contract between
employees and their employers.2
Recognition of the Act’s anti-opportunism purpose sheds new
light on questions about the regulation of inherently dangerous
jobs. A recent case involving the tragic death of a SeaWorld orca
whale trainer, Dawn Brancheau, illustrates the issue. In 2010,
Brancheau was killed by an orca whale named Tilikum.3 Following
the incident, SeaWorld significantly changed its orca whale shows4
and was cited by the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) for a violation of the Act’s “general duty”
clause.5 The general duty clause requires employers to provide
1. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 23, 26–28 (1982)
(describing the classic justifications for regulating in response to externalities (or spillovers)
and in response to inadequate information); W. Kip Viscusi & Ted Gayer, Safety at Any Price?,
25 REG. 54, 54 (2002) (“Government action in the health and safety arena can be justified
when there are shortcomings in risk information or textbook cases of externalities.”).
2. See Ian R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the
Need for a “Rich Classificatory Apparatus”, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018, 1024 n.20 (1981) (defining
opportunism as “[s]elf-interest seeking contrary to the principles of the relation in which
it occurs”).
3. SeaWorld of Florida, LLC v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202, 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
4. Lori Weisberg, SeaWorld Settles Orca Trainer Safety Citations, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2016, 3:00 A.M.), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-seaworld-osha-20160106story.html (noting that SeaWorld “put an end to trainers cavorting in the water with the
whales” after Brancheau’s death in 2010). SeaWorld has since announced that it is
phasing out entirely its practice of keeping and breeding orca whales in captivity.
Greg Allen, SeaWorld Agrees to End Captive Breeding of Killer Whales, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Mar. 17, 2016, 5:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/17/
470720804/seaworld-agrees-to-end-captive-breeding-of-killer-whales.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2014); SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 24 BNA OSHC 1303 (No.
10-1705, 2012) (ALJ). The general duty citation was for “exposing animal trainers to struck-
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“employment and a place of employment which are free from
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
serious physical harm to his employees[.]”6 OSHA proposed that
SeaWorld abate the violation by either providing a physical barrier
between trainers and whales or maintaining a minimum distance
between them.7 In SeaWorld of Florida, LLC v. Perez, a divided panel
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ultimately upheld
the citation, including the proposed abatement: there would be no
more SeaWorld trainers in the water with orca whales during
shows.8 Then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh dissented.9
Judge Kavanaugh believed OSHA had overstepped its bounds
by regulating employment that is, by nature, inherently dangerous,
just like many other sports or entertainment jobs. Judge Kavanaugh
wondered how the abatement required in SeaWorld was any
different than OSHA prohibiting tackling in the National Football
League (NFL) or imposing speed limits in NASCAR races.10
Grappling with this issue, Judge Kavanaugh questioned:

by and drowning hazards” when working with the orcas. See id. In addition to legal
proceedings, SeaWorld faced significant public pressure regarding its handling of orca
whales in the wake of the popular documentary film Blackfish (CNN Films 2013). See Michal
Addady, SeaWorld Will Stop Making Killer Whales Dance for You, FORTUNE (May 2, 2016),
http://fortune.com/2016/05/02/seaworld-orcas/.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2012). The elements of a general duty clause violation are:
(1) an activity or condition in the employer’s workplace presented a hazard to an
employee, (2) either the employer or the industry recognized the condition or
activity as a hazard, (3) the hazard was likely to or actually caused death or serious
physical harm, and (4) a feasible means to eliminate or materially reduce the
hazard existed.
SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 748 F.3d at 1207.
7. SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 748 F.3d at 1204–05, 1211, 1215 (denying petition for
review). The proposed abatement would specifically prohibit trainers from working with
orcas “unless the trainers are protected through the use of physical barriers or through the
use of decking systems [which can raise pool floors], oxygen supply systems or other
engineering or administrative controls that provide the same or greater level of protection
for the trainers.” SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 2012 WL 3019734 at *11. The citation was first
upheld by an Administrative Law Judge of the Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission. SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 2012 WL 3019734 at *30.
8. SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 748 F.3d at 1204–05, 1211, 1215 (finding the ordered
abatement feasible and noting that SeaWorld had already implemented many of the
abatement procedures voluntarily after Brancheau’s death, including the cessation of all
“waterwork” by trainers during performances).
9. Id. at 1216-22 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
10. Both Judge Kavanaugh and counsel for SeaWorld, Eugene Scalia, relied on the
NFL and NASCAR examples. Id. at 1220; Final Opening Brief for Petitioner SeaWorld of
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When should we as a society paternalistically decide that the
participants in these sports and entertainment activities must be
protected from themselves—that the risk of significant physical
injury is simply too great even for eager and willing participants?
And most importantly for this case, who decides that the risk to
participants is too high?11

These are important normative questions about the appropriate
boundaries of workplace safety regulation and OSHA’s
administrative enforcement authority.12 Judge Kavanaugh’s
questions can be answered only by carefully examining the
theoretical justifications for OSHA regulation. Traditional
economic justifications would only permit OSHA regulation where
the participants (here, the trainers) suffer from a specified
information deficiency severe enough to undermine the contention
that they are truly “eager and willing” participants. Even then,
adherents of efficiency analysis would prescribe only narrow
information-forcing regulation.13 But if an additional purpose of the
Act is to combat employer opportunism, then regulation would
Florida, LLC at 2–3, SeaWorld, 748 F.3d 1202 (No. 12-1375); see also Natalie Rodriguez,
SeaWorld Ruling May Embolden OSHA to Tackle New Sectors, LAW360 (Apr. 28, 2014, 7:01 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/528544/seaworld-ruling-may-embolden-osha-to-tacklenew-sectors; Gloria Gonzalez, OSHA Flexes Its Regulatory Muscle, BUS. INS. (Jan. 3, 2016),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20160103/NEWS08/151239972/osha-flexesits-regulatory-muscle-under-guidance-of-assistant?tags=%7C329%7C304.
11. SeaWorld of Florida, LLC, 748 F.3d at 1217 (emphasis in original). Judge Kavanaugh
concluded that the Department of Labor, applying occupational safety laws, was not the
proper body to determine whether the risks posed by sports or entertainment jobs were
unreasonable. Instead, he argued other institutions including Congress, state legislatures,
state regulators, and state or federal courts applying tort law were in a better position to
make those determinations. Id. at 1222. Judge Kavanaugh’s argument echoes a position first
taken by former Chief Justice Rehnquist in Industrial Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607, 671–88 (1980) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring), and later revived by Professor Cass
Sunstein, that the Act’s operative provisions on health standards amount to an
unconstitutional delegation of Congress’s legislative authority. Cass R. Sunstein, Is OSHA
Unconstitutional?, 94 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1410–11 (2008).
12. Questions about OSHA’s authority to regulate inherently dangerous jobs under
the general duty clause were raised shortly after the Act became effective yet have never
been satisfactorily answered. See, e.g., Richard S. Miller, The Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970 and the Law of Torts, 38 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 612, 623 (1974) (identifying
“professional athletics, police work, fire prevention, explosives manufacturing, and some
kinds of scientific experimentation” as occupations of great social importance that “cannot
be carried on without the presence of some such hazards”).
13. See Thomas A. Lambert, Avoiding Regulatory Mismatch in the Workplace: An
Informational Approach to Workplace Safety Regulation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 1006, 1009 (2004)
(rejecting risk-prohibition regulation in workplace safety, in favor of information-forcing
regulation that is narrowly crafted to respond to information failures).
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also be prescribed where necessary to enforce the relational
expectations of employees like the trainers at SeaWorld. A
relational view would take a closer look at the details of the
employment exchange and craft a regulatory response designed to
eliminate employer opportunism. A close inspection of the factual
record in SeaWorld, with a focus on the parties’ relational
expectations, confirms that OSHA’s citation and abatement order
were proper.
As a society, we recognize that all work poses some degree of
risk and that employees, like Brancheau, are generally free to take
on risky work in exchange for consideration.14 But regulatory limits
on this general freedom, including the imposition of OSHA
standards, are justified when necessary to respond to identified
market failures or prevent opportunistic behavior. Moreover, antiopportunism functions as a limiting principle. The antiopportunism purpose of OSHA can be used to identify meaningful
distinctions between the SeaWorld employment exchange and the
NFL and NASCAR hypotheticals that troubled Judge Kavanaugh.
It could serve as the basis for the creation of an affirmative defense
to avoid overbroad application of the general duty clause. The antiopportunism principle explains how we can at once conclude that
the SeaWorld case was correctly decided, and also that the NFL
should be permitted to continue employing professional tackle
football players.
This Article argues that the Act has an anti-opportunism
purpose, justifying regulatory action designed to enforce the
relational expectations of employees and employers.15 Part II sets
14. See id. at 1014 (“[S]ome degree of safety risk necessarily accompanies productive
activity, and the only way to eliminate all risk would be to eliminate all productive
activity.”); see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1129, 1168 (1986) (citing studies providing “evidence that workers demand and obtain
considerable wage premiums for exposing themselves to workplace hazards”); Lambert,
supra note 13, at 1022 n.69 (collecting empirical studies supporting the proposition that
“employers must pay risk premiums for exposing their employees to perceived risks”).
Aside from the empirical evidence on compensating wage differentials, the idea dates back
to at least Adam Smith. See generally ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
15. Many other scholars have previously noted the importance of the relational
character of employment contracts, including the father of relational contract theory, Ian
Macneil. See, e.g., Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 877, 897 (2000) (“Relational contract law is so all-pervasive that one feels almost
foolish in giving examples. A few examples from but one type of contractual relation,
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the stage by outlining the ongoing search for the unifying
normative purpose(s) of employment law in the United States. Part
III draws on the core tenets of relational contract theory, as well as
new scholarly insights on the quasi-fiduciary nature of the
employment relationship, to posit another central purpose for
employment law—anti-opportunism. Part IV then narrows the
focus by applying an anti-opportunism principle to the subfield of
workplace safety law. In doing so, Part IV develops a set of
corollaries, all drawn from the central anti-opportunism purpose,
that ought to guide the case-by-case application of OSHA
regulations. Finally, Part V addresses Judge Kavanaugh’s questions
by examining OSHA’s enforcement structure and applying the
anti-opportunism principle to a close review of the factual record
in SeaWorld.
II. SEARCHING FOR THE PURPOSE(S) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW
Before considering the Act’s purposes, we must begin by
considering the purpose of employment law generally.
Individual employment law16 is a sprawling field, sometimes
characterized as a mishmash, a jumble, a hotchpotch, or a grab bag
of largely disconnected federal and state constitutional protections;
federal, state, and local statutory protections; administrative
regulations, and common law governing the employment

employment, will do: workmen’s compensation, numerous anti-discrimination laws, social
security taxation and benefits, ERISA, OSHA, other workplace regulations, wage and hours
legislation. All of these are relational contract law.”); Robert C. Bird, Employment as a
Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149, 215 (2005) (“Employment is a relational
contract. . . . Yet, current law insufficiently acknowledges relational norms.”); see also
Symposium, Relational Contracting in a Digital Age, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 675, 681 (2005)
(comments of Professor Rachel Arnow-Richman).
16. Employment law, or what I will sometimes refer to as individual employment law,
should be distinguished from traditional labor law governing collective bargaining between
employers and the bargaining representatives of groups of employees. Relational contract
theorists such as Ian Macneil view traditional labor law as another example of relational
contract law. See Macneil, supra note 15, at 897 (“All of these are relational contract law. . . .
To which needs to be added where collective bargaining is in place, the NLRA, LMRA, and
a wide range of law governing unions and other aspects of collective bargaining.”). My focus
here is on workplace safety law applicable to individual employees, apart from any separate
considerations that may arise in the context of collective bargaining.
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relationship.17 This mishmash includes subjects such as the
principle of employment at-will, express and implied contracts
for employment, tort limitations on the at-will principle, speech,
association, and privacy rights; trade secret and intellectual
property rights; duties of loyalty, wage and hour protections;
family and sick leave protections; antidiscrimination protections,
employee benefit protections, health and safety protections;
and more.18
Despite its breadth, the American Law Institute (ALI)
recognized employment law as a sufficiently cohesive field to
warrant the ALI’s publication, in July 2015, of the Restatement of
Employment Law.19 The Restatement project was controversial
from the start,20 and much of the controversy centered on a lack of
17. See STEVEN WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (5th ed.
2012) (noting that texts on employment law can run into a “grab-bag problem”); see also
Matthew T. Bodie, The Roberts Court and the Law of Human Resources, BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 159, 164 (2013) (one of the restatement reporters, writing “employment law focuses on the
employment contract and a grab bag of other regulatory provisions”); Jonathan D. Canter,
The Employment Arbitrator and the Pro Se Party, 57 DISP. RESOL. J. 52, 53 (2002) (“a jumble of
statutory and common law rights and remedies”); Matthew W. Finkin, Second Thoughts on a
Restatement of Employment Law, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 279 (2005) (“The law of
employment in the United States is a hotchpotch of constitutional provisions, legislative
dictates, administrative rules, and common law—of tort and contract—that varies widely
from state to state.”); Brishen Rogers, What Does Social Equality Require of Employers? A
Response to Professor Bagenstos, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 83, 83 (2014) (“apparent
doctrinal mishmash”); Charles A. Sullivan, Is There a Madness to the Method?: Torts and Other
Influences on Employment Discrimination Law, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1079, 1080 n.3 (2014) (noting that
some would describe the Restatement of Employment Law as a “mishmash”); Michael J.
Zimmer, The Restatement of Employment Law Is the Wrong Project, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
205, 206 (2009) (“[L]abor and employment law in this country is a mishmash.”).
18. See generally TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING
AND ITS LIMITATIONS, at xi–xix (3d ed. 2015). See also WILLBORN, supra note 17, at vii–xxi.
19. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW (AM. LAW INST. 2015). The ALI’s charter
defines its own purpose as “to promote the clarification and simplification of the law and its
better adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration of justice, and to
encourage and carry on scholarly and scientific legal work.” See American Law Institute,
Certificate of Incorporation, https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/10/62/106284da-ddfe4ff4-a698-0a47f268ee4c/certificate-of-incorporation.pdf (last visited October 13, 2019); see
also Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement Movement, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 434 (2004).
20. The entire project of restating the field of employment law was called into question
by several notable scholars, including several members of the Labor Law Group, an
organization originally founded in 1947 that includes law professors specializing in labor
and employment law. See Group History, LABOR LAW GROUP, http://laborlawgroup.org/
?page_id=8s (last visited October 13, 2019). The Labor Law Group submitted a petition in
2007, signed by sixty-two professors of labor and employment law, urging that the project
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consensus about the overarching purpose (or purposes) of
employment law.21 Why should there exist a separate body of law
that uniquely governs the employment relationship, rather than
simply having general principles of contract and tort law govern
the parties?22 What should be the purpose of this separate body of
employment law? The ALI’s Restatement reporters did not answer
these questions, nor did they ever set out to do so.23 But the
extended controversy surrounding whether a Restatement of
Employment Law should exist at all hints at the deeply uncertain
be halted. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, A Conference on the American Law Institute’s Proposed
Restatement of Employment Law, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1 app. 2 at 32 (2009).
21. The late Michael Zimmer, a leading employment law scholar and member of the
ALI, argued that the Restatement was premature, because the disorganized common law
“black letter rules are fundamentally floating free of any basic theoretical grounding.” See
Zimmer, supra note 17, at 206. He criticized the ALI for beginning the Restatement project
without first conducting a principles project that would have as its goal the identification of
possible “overarching purposes” of employment law. Id. (“I think [the ALI] should start with
a project on the principles of labor and employment law. The goal of a principles project
would be to answer two questions: First, what are, and what should be, the overarching
purposes of constitutional, statutory and common law approaches to labor and employment
law? Second, how can the law be developed in ways to best serve those purposes?”). Zimmer
recognized that arriving at a consensus on these questions through a principles project was
unlikely but saw potential value in identifying those principles supported by consensus and
narrowing the “range of difference” on the principles lacking consensus. See id.
22. See Alan Hyde, Response to Working Group on Chapter 1 of the Proposed Restatement
of Employment Law: On Purposeless Restatement, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 87, 87 (2009)
(criticizing the ALI for not beginning its project with consideration of questions such as
“What is employment law? Why does employment law exist as a distinct subject? What is
the point of having distinct rules for relations of employment?”); Lea VanderVelde, The
Proposed Restatement of Employment Law at Midpoint, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 359, 362
(2012) (“[T]he Institute decision to go forward [with the Restatement project] was made
without any sustained discussion within the Institute about two meta-issues critical to its
endeavor. First, what is the purpose of employment law? Is it the protection of workers or
the containment of tort damages? And, when those purposes are in tension, how should that
tension be resolved? Second, . . . what is the purpose of a restatement of the common law,
and how is that purpose served here?”); see also Catherine Fisk & Adam Barry, Contingent
Loyalty and Restricted Exit: Commentary on the Restatement of Employment Law, 16 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 413, 417-18 (2012) (comparing drafts of chapters two and eight of the
Restatement and arguing that the Restatement is internally inconsistent regarding its
“visions about the employment relationship and about employee mobility”).
23. Samuel Estreicher et al., Foreword: The Restatement of Employment Law Project, 100
CORNELL L. REV. 1245, 1247–48 (2015). The reporters took as their principle audience judges
and practitioners, and they viewed the performance of their task as constrained in a way
similar to the constraints on judges—discerning, understanding, and articulating what the
law is on a given point, apart from their personal views about what the law ought to be. See
id. at 1248. The reporters recognized that the law governing employment relationships is
influenced by a range of public policies, that these policies will at times be in direct
tension with each other, and that the policies are shaped by social values that change over
time. See id.
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footing of employment law and highlights the need for continued
attention to these questions.
Scholars have been struggling to identify the normative
purposes of employment law since long before the Restatement
project began,24 and that work continues.25 The theory that
implicitly or explicitly undergirds the majority of academic
literature and pedagogy in the field is economic efficiency.26 If
economic efficiency is the purpose of employment law, then the
role of law generally is to intervene only where there exists an
identified failure of the unregulated labor market to produce
socially efficient outcomes.27 As Samuel Bagenstos puts it: “In line
24. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947,
976 (1984) (defending a strong employment at will rule on efficiency grounds); Charles Fried,
Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law
and Its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1019 (1984) (“We should consider afresh what goals
[our employment law system] should seek to attain and what rights it must respect.”);
Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92
MICH. L. REV. 8, 12 (1993) (considering employment, and particularly career employment, as
a type of relational contract); see also Simon Deakin, The Law and Economics of Employment
Protection Legislation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 330, 333–38 (Cynthia L. Estlund & Michael L. Wachter eds., 2012)
(describing the early “first generation” of economics-based critiques of employment
legislation, including Epstein, supra, as well as subsequent developments in the economic
analysis of employment laws).
25. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L.
REV. 225, 229 (2013); Hyde, supra note 22, at 87; Rogers, supra note 17, at 83 (asking whether
employment law, “[g]iven its decentralized origins,” can “even have a normative core?” and
agreeing with Bagenstos that it can); Zimmer, supra note 17, at 206.
26. STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE OBJECTS:
BRINGING WORKPLACE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY INTO FOCUS 47 (2009) (“[T]he efficiency
objective is currently ascendant in the American workplace.”); Bagenstos, supra note 25, at
229, 229 n.12 (“One approach, exemplified by the work of Stewart Schwab and Alan Hyde,
argues that individual employment law is justified if, and to the extent that, it serves the goal
of economic efficiency.”). As Professor Bagenstos notes, one of the leading employment law
textbooks uses economic efficiency as its first organizing theme. See id. at 229, 229 n.13
(referring to WILLBORN ET AL., supra note 17); see generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 436–55 (8th ed. 2011) (applying economic analysis to various subtopics
within individual employment law).
27. See, e.g., Hyde, supra note 22, at 89 (noting that federal employment legislation “is
typically adopted when market failures prevent atomized markets from reaching efficient
results”); Stewart J. Schwab, Predicting the Future of Employment Law: Reflecting or Refracting
Market Forces?, 76 IND. L.J. 29, 35 (2001) (“[E]mployment laws increasingly will have to be
justified as responding to market failure . . . . Such market failures include collective goods
problems or asymmetric-information problems.”); see generally Christine Jolls, Law and the
Labor Market, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 359, 360 (2006) (“Because of the way in which the
market constrains the prospects for using employment law purely to effect transfers of
resources, the economic analysis of employment law in this review gives primary emphasis
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with [this economic efficiency] argument, employment law
scholarship fairly drips with economic-efficiency analysis.”28
Professor Simon Deakin details multiple generations of theoretical
accounts of employment law based on increasingly sophisticated
tools and understandings of economic analysis.29 The powerful
influence of the economic efficiency theory is likewise reflected
in a number of judicial opinions interpreting and applying
the existing individual employment laws with reference to
efficiency goals.30
A second possibility is that the purpose of employment law is
to counteract bargaining power disparities by protecting the
weaker party (employee) against the stronger party (employer).31

to market failures in the employer-employee relationship. In the presence of a market failure,
legal intervention through employment law may both enhance efficiency and make
employees better off.”).
28. Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 229.
29. See Deakin, supra note 24, at 333–38. Deakin highlights the insights that have been
incorporated into later iterations of economic analysis of employment laws. These include,
among other things, concepts of transaction costs, information asymmetries, and
externalities that can undermine assumptions of a perfectly competitive labor market. See id.
at 334–35. An even more recent wave of analysis, termed “a systemic-evolutionary”
approach, views employment laws as “endogenous” to labor markets. That is, governmental
interventions “often do no more than crystallize social norms or conventions that first
emerge at the level of the market, in the form of behavioural patterns or routines, and that
then go on to acquire greater formality in contractual agreements and legislative texts.” Id.
at 336.
30. See, e.g., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 445–48 (Del.
1996) (disapproving punitive damages for an employer’s breach of employment contract,
citing efficient breach theory and the market forces applicable to employers); see also
Gaglidari v. Denny’s Rests., Inc., 815 P.2d 1362, 1377 (Wash. 1991) (Utter, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (contending that emotional distress damages should be available
against a breaching employer as a means of discouraging economically inefficient breaches);
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 396 (Cal. 1988) (applying economic analysis to
reject an employee’s tort claim for breach of good faith and fair dealing); Reddy v. Cmty.
Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 913 (W. Va. 1982) (“Economic analysis compels the
conclusion that restrictive covenants should be upheld where the employee has undergone
certain types of training. Restrictive covenant protection is necessary, for example, to
encourage efficient and extensive investment in ‘human capital.’”).
31. See Ian Ayres & Stewart Schwab, The Employment Contract, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
71, 74–75 (1999) (noting that non-economists view unequal bargaining power as “the basic
argument for legal intervention in employment markets[,]” and criticizing bargaining power
disparity as a rationale for employment law intervention); Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 230
(“The other approach argues that the government should regulate the employment
relationship to rectify imbalances of bargaining power between employers and
employees.”); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 20, at 10 (describing the comments of Matthew Finkin
at a conference of the Labor Law Group, who noted that “protecting employees from
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In this account, existing individual employment law interventions
are designed to protect employees from unfair outcomes resulting
from the employer’s superior financial position and the employee’s
financial dependence on a regular income stream.32 As a guiding
normative justification for employment law, the bargaining power
theory has received less support than the economic efficiency
theory.33 Economics scholars are generally critical of this theory of
employment law because a neoclassical economic analysis would
not consider bargaining power disparities to constitute a systemic
“market failure” justifying legal intervention.34
Legal scholars have recently hit upon a third category of
possible normative justifications for employment law: addressing
concerns about persistent social or status inequality.35 In this view,
the purpose of individual employment law is to promote social
equality by intervening where necessary to eliminate or mitigate
“not merely those practices that entrench caste-based deprivations

exploitation because of inequity in bargaining power was indeed a guiding principle of
employment law in many European countries.”); Cynthia Estlund, Between Rights and
Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment
Law, 155 U. PENN. L. REV. 379, 384–85 (2006) (“Skepticism about the bargaining power of
employees has contributed to courts’ willingness to intervene in the employment contract to
redress abuses that offend public policy[.]”); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal
Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982) (illustrating the weaknesses of bargaining power
disparity as a justification for law’s imposition of mandatory terms).
32. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 26, at 14, 30, 150 (describing the need to balance
bargaining power disparities as one important component of the authors’ pluralist account
of the purpose of employment law, discussed further below).
33. See Ayres & Schwab, supra note 31, at 77 (“It’s not unequal bargaining power.
That’s the argument that economists think is just not a coherent or logical explanation for
why the preferences of workers won’t be honored. It’s not an example of market failure.
Other examples of market failure may explain or justify intervention in the name of
safety. . . . But unequal bargaining power is not the explanation for what went wrong.”);
Kennedy, supra note 31. As Aditi Bagchi notes, bargaining power disparities are not unique
to employment contracts and the existence of a bargaining power disparity alone “tells us
little about the fairness of the transaction, let alone the need for legal treatment favorable to
the weaker party.” Aditi Bagchi, The Myth of Equality in the Employment Relation, 2009 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 579, 585 (2009). Bagchi contends that recognizing bargaining power disparity does
not sufficiently capture the full extent of inequality between employees and employers, see
id. at 589, and urges a status-based approach to employment law that would justify legal
interventions to mitigate status inequalities. See id. at 582–83, 609–14, 628.
34. See Ayres & Schwab, supra note 31, at 74–77.
35. See Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 228; Bagchi, supra note 33, at 582–83.
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but also those practices that would tend to undermine any worker’s
status as an equal to her employer, boss, or supervisor.”36
A fourth view, pluralism, appeals to those who question
whether there is or should be any single unifying purpose driving
all statutory and doctrinal facets of employment law. Stephen
Befort and John Budd advance this type of pluralist theory in
Invisible Hands, Invisible Objects.37 Befort and Budd argue:
Our proposals for principled reform start with the pluralist model
of the employment relationship. We see employees as more than
simply commodities—employees are human beings with
economic and psychological needs, as well as with citizenship
rights in a democratic society. We see markets as important, but
as falling short of the textbook economics model of perfect
competition. . . . And we see the employment relationship as
characterized by a plurality of legitimate interests; employers and
employees have shared as well as conflicting goals. Putting these
assumptions together means that workplace law should help
balance the power of employers and employees to prevent
substandard work outcomes, promote a vibrant, participatory
democracy, and create broadly shared prosperity.38

In Befort and Budd’s view, then, employment law ought to be
driven by a careful balancing of three principles—recognizing the
importance of economic efficiency, ensuring adequate balancing of
bargaining power between employees and employers, and
maintaining minimum standards of social equality and democratic
participation.39 Befort and Budd contend that “the central purpose
of a reformed system of workplace law and public policy should be
to balance efficiency, equity, and voice.”40 An obvious difficulty
36. Bagenstos, supra note 25, at 228 (emphasis in original).
37. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 26, at 117–31.
38. Id. at 120–21.
39. See id. at 122. Befort and Budd recognize the importance of efficiency but urge that
it must be subject to “social and human boundaries.” Id. at 121. In Befort and Budd’s account,
these social and human boundaries are “equity,” which they define as “the fairness of the
distribution and security of economic rewards[;]” and “voice,” defined as “opportunities for
workers to shape their working lives[.]” Id. at 6, 121. Befort and Budd sometimes refer to this
as employment “with a human face,” id. at 130, which can only be achieved “when efficiency
is balanced with equity and voice.” Id. at 122.
40. Id. at 121. Befort and Budd acknowledge that it can be “difficult to know when a
balance has been achieved.” Id. at 123. But they argue, “this does not obviate the need for
guiding principles.” Id. They set out a “scorecard” for evaluating how well current
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with this approach is discerning precisely where that balance lies
for any given question within employment law.
Finally, while it shares some common ground with the pluralist
account, relationalism might be categorized as a fifth distinct way
of ordering and explaining the broad field of employment law.
Relationalism as a normative guide for employment law builds
upon the relational theory of contract, whose chief proponent is Ian
Macneil.41 The relational contract theory is discussed in detail
below, in Part III. For now, it is enough simply to note that the
critical insight of relational contract theory is that many contracts
are characterized more by ongoing relationships with some
elements of both competition and cooperation, than by discrete
one-shot exchanges, where competitive elements dominate and
each side tries to extract maximum gains from the one-shot trade.42
To say that employment contracts may be particularly wellsuited to characterization as relational contracts is an
understatement. While some scholars have considered the
possibility of building employment law doctrine more explicitly
around a recognition that employment contracts are relational,
these efforts have been exclusively focused on the employment atwill doctrine.43 There has been no sustained scholarly effort to
extend a relational theory beyond the employment at-will doctrine
and into other employment law subfields, such as workplace
safety. This Article attempts to do just that, drawing from relational
contract theory the guiding principle of anti-opportunism.
The Restatement of Employment Law does not discernably
follow any of the foregoing normative approaches to employment
employment law (and potential reforms) perform on the axes of efficiency, equity, and voice.
See id. at 6, 112. In their evaluation, Befort and Budd conclude that current U.S. employment
law is strong in attaining economic efficiency, but weak on measures of worker voice and
social equity. Id. at 112.
41. See generally IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED
WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL (David Campbell ed., 2001) [hereinafter SELECTED WORKS OF IAN
MACNEIL]. It should be noted that Macneil routinely disclaimed that his writings included
any normative prescriptions for the law. See Ian Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges
and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 877, 899 (2000) (“I challenge to a duel anyone who, after this
notice, persists in converting my descriptions of relational contract law into prescriptions of
what the law should be, particularly prescriptions of some universal application of relational
contract law.”).
42. See generally SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL, supra note 41.
43. See Bird, supra note 15, passim; Marion Crain, Arm’s-Length Intimacy: Employment as
Relationship, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 163, 180–81 (2011).
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law. The Restatement reporters did not set out to resolve
fundamental questions about the overarching purposes of
employment law.44 Nor did the reporters consistently refer to any
particular normative theory when explaining choices made
between competing lines of common law authority on points of
black letter law.45 If the reporters went about their work with a
pluralist balancing of possible normative goals in mind, that
balancing is not explained. Nor did the reporters leave evidence of
the sort of careful balancing that might fit Befort and Budd’s
explicitly pluralist formulation.46 Likewise, the reporters left no
evidence that relationalist insights drove any of their doctrinal
choices. Instead, the ALI’s effort was restricted to a descriptive
exposition of key principles of the black letter law.47
Locating a single normative justification for the entire field of
employment law may be impossible. Some jumbled blend of
the justifications described above, along with other distributional
or political motivations, probably best explains the mishmash
of individual employment law doctrines and statutory

44. See VanderVelde, supra note 22, at 362–63.
45. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 20, at 23 (“[W]ithout such a fundamental discussion
[about the purpose of a separate Restatement of employment law], it would be hard to make
it consistent with the other ALI Restatements on contract and tort or to determine what the
Restatement of employment law ‘should be’ in choosing among competing precedents.”).
The Reporters’ Notes to the final version of the Restatement often only identify the existence
of authority contrary to the black letter restatement formulation, without any attempt to tie
the choice of black letter rule to a normative theory. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
LAW § 3.05 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (Reporters’ Notes) (split of authority regarding
recognition of an implied duty of good faith in at-will employment arrangements); § 5.03
cmt. c (Reporters’ Notes) (split of authority on whether federal law may serve as a source of
state public policy for an employee’s tort claim). In some cases, the reporters offered cursory
explanations for their choices, but these explanations were not clearly grounded in any
identifiable normative principles. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.06 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 2018) (Reporters’ Notes) (“This Restatement rejects the position of those
courts requiring employees formally to agree to any adverse change in terms from prior
unilateral statements [of employer policy], regardless of whether the prior statement created
vested or accrued rights. . . . Some of these holdings remain unclear.”).
46. See supra note 45; see generally RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW (AM. LAW
INST. 2015).
47. See Estreicher et al., supra note 23, at 1247–48 (“The Restatement of Employment
Law is not a law review article. . . . Although we are academics and have written many law
review articles and books over the years, that was not our mission or orientation as
Reporters. Our task and constraints were closer to those of judges. . . . The Restatement task,
as we see it, is to articulate a relatively precise and detailed set of principles that help explain
most results in a particular field or, at the least, provide useful guidance for judges and
practicing lawyers laboring in the field.”).
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interventions.48 But this recognition should not end the search for
employment law’s normative purposes.
This Article explores the possibility that relationalism can give
purpose to employment law in the context of OSHA and workplace
safety regulation. This subfield of employment law has received
relatively little scholarly attention from employment law theorists.
In the literature that does exist, strong adherents of economic
efficiency theory have questioned whether any workplace safety
regulatory interventions are necessary or wise.49 As described in
Part III, the relational dimension of employment contracts suggests
an important qualification on the now-dominant use of economic
analysis in workplace safety regulation. Part III introduces the
reader to the relational theory of contract, its chief proponent, Ian
Macneil,50 and its implications for the development and ordering of
employment law.
III. THE ANTI-OPPORTUNISM PURPOSE:
INSIGHTS FROM RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY
Why does employment law exist apart from ordinary contract
law? If employment is simply a contractual relationship, then why
is a separate Restatement of Employment Law even necessary at all
when the Restatement (Second) of Contracts is available to us? And
why does the Restatement of Employment Law draw, in many
places, on principles of tort and agency in combination with
some principles of contract law to construct a seemingly

48. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 26, at 16 (“[T]he patchwork system of workplace
law and public policy undoubtedly reflects the changing power dynamics of various interest
groups in different eras[.]”).
49. The most extreme version of this argument is that OSHA should be abolished
entirely. See John Hood, OSHA’s Trivial Pursuit; In Workplace Safety, Business Outperforms the
Regulators, 73 POL’Y REV. 59, at 59–60 (1995); Thomas J. Kniesner & John D. Leeth, Abolishing
OSHA, 4 REG. 46, 46 (1995); William J. Maakestad & Charles Helm, Promoting Workplace Safety
and Health in the Post-Regulatory Era: A Primer on Non-OSHA Legal Incentives that Influence
Employer Decisions to Control Occupational Hazards, 17 N. KY. L. REV. 9, 13–14 (1989).
50. See David Campbell, Ian Macneil and the Relational Theory of Contract, in SELECTED
WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL, supra note 41, at 4 (David Campbell ed., 2001) (“[Macneil’s]
principal achievement has been that in thirty or so of the more than fifty books and articles
he has published since 1960 he has set out the principal formulation of what has come to be
known as ‘the relational theory’ of the law of contract.”).
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inconsistent blend of rules that is unique to the governance of
employment relationships?51
The answer, of course, is that employment is not simply a
contractual relationship.52 Special features—relational features—of
the employment contract have long been viewed as justification for
the application of a special set of rules to govern employment. What
we now call employment law has its roots in the preindustrial
English common law of “Master and Servant,” the applicability of
which turned on the status of the individuals’ relationship.53 As
Robert Bird notes, despite the rise of neoclassical and free-labor
contract theories, employment, in practice, still reflects a great deal
of interdependence between employees and employers and
“retains much of its master-servant roots.”54 That is to say, the
Restatement of Employment Law, as a new legal authority separate
51. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2018)
(Reporters’ Notes) (citing various provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
Restatement (Third) of Torts, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency); Dau-Schmidt, supra
note 20, at 10 (describing Alan Hyde’s concern, expressed at a conference of the Labor Law
Group, that the reporters would need to “discuss what is unique about the employment
relationship and why it needs a Restatement apart from the general Restatements of tort and
contract.”); Sullivan, supra note 17, at 1080 n.3 (the Restatement includes pure contract and
pure tort, as well as doctrines that are neither clearly contract nor clearly tort).
52. See Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 836
(2017) (“But this contractual account [of employment] is incomplete. Our society has, in fact,
imposed a series of significant duties upon employers with respect to the employment
relationship. . . . It is not simply contractual, and it is not simply a principal-agent
relationship. Instead, as these primarily statutory duties suggest, we view the employment
relationship as a unique one in which both employers and employees take on significant
responsibilities when they undertake such an arrangement.”).
53. See Bird, supra note 1515, at 215 (“In essence, employment law has its origins in a
master-servant relationship, characterized by status-based relationships of profound
interdependence.”); Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One
and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 302 (2001); Robert W.
Gordon, Using History in Teaching Contracts: The Case of Britton v. Turner, 26 U. HAW. L. REV.
423, 428 (2004) (“American courts in the early republic invented the new field of
‘employment law’ to govern work relations in industrial society. The template they used . . .
was lifted, however, from the pre-industrial household—from the law of Master and
Servant.”); Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies to Markets: FedEx Drivers and the Work Contract
as Institutional Marker, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1083, 1100–01 (2015); see also Bodie, supra
note 52, at 830–31 (recognizing pre-industrial English master-servant common law as the
historical origin of employment law, and arguing that the shift to modern business
organizations compels consideration of the theory of the “firm” to understand the fiduciary
or quasi-fiduciary nature of the modern employee-employer relationship); Stephen NayakYoung, Revising the Roles of Master and Servant: A Theory of Work Law, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1223,
1228 (2015) (describing work law’s “emergence from the laws of master and servant[,]”
which was “a distinctive form of status-based law”).
54. See Bird, supra note 15, at 160–61.

380

001.BENT_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

365

2/14/20 1:49 PM

OSHA, the Opportunism Police

from its Contract and Tort counterparts, is really just the latest
version of a centuries-long legal tradition of treating the
employment relation differently, precisely because of certain
special characteristics of that relationship.55
This Part advances the claim that any formulation of organizing
principles of employment law must account for the uniquely
relational aspect of the employment contract, which in turn leads
to recognition of an anti-opportunism principle. We begin with an
introduction to the relational theory of contract and the
fundamental ideas about human exchange that gave rise to it.56 We
will then identify the internal and external norms that shape
relational expectations, followed by a discussion of how those
relational expectations can give rise to opportunism.
A. Relational Contract Theory
It is probably impossible to accurately distill into a short
summary the relational theory of contract. One complication is that
it can only be conveyed effectively by contrasting it with the
prevailing classical, and now neoclassical, account of contract.57
Classical contract law is a relatively rigid, unitary body of law (with
some contextualizing exceptions introduced in the neoclassical
account) constructed on the fundamental assumption that
contracting parties are rational, wealth-maximizing actors who are

55. See Franklin G. Snyder, The Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships on the Law
of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33, 34 (2003) (arguing that “employment is not really
a contractual relationship at all; it is, and always has been, one of status” and that “it has been
one since time immemorial and continues to be treated so today, regardless of the legal
theories applied”).
56. A comprehensive account of the theory is neither necessary nor attempted here.
For more detail, see SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL, supra note 41.
57. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. L.
REV. 805, 805 (2000) (“Like most modern contract theories, relational contract theory can only
be understood against the backdrop of the school of classical contract law, to which it stands
in opposition.”). Neoclassical contract law represents a modern refinement of classical
contract law in response to critiques about the rigidity of classical contract theory and its
resulting inability to account for different factual contexts. See Jay M. Feinman, Relational
Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 738–39 (2000) (describing the Uniform
Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts as neoclassical, in the sense
that they soften and permit contextualization of classical contract doctrine); James W. Fox,
Jr., Relational Contract Theory and Democratic Citizenship, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003).
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acting within a competitive market.58 Classical contract law is
implicitly built upon the assumption that the exchanges governed
by contract law are essentially “discrete”—one-shot, spot market
transactions entered into by strangers with no shared history of
dealings, no expected future dealings, and ultimately no reason to
act in any way cooperatively with the other party to the contract.59
One of Macneil’s critical insights, now widely accepted, is that,
as an empirical matter, the assumption of discrete exchange does
not accurately reflect most contractual exchanges in the real
world.60 In reality, all contracts take place within the context of
some larger relation.61 Some transactions have more complex, longterm relational components while others are less relational, or more
“discrete.” The various types of transactions can be thought of
along a continuum. The relational contract theory is perhaps best
known for its depiction of a spectrum of types of transactions,
ranging from “as-if-discrete” (but not quite perfectly discrete62)

58. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 805 (“Classical contract law . . . was axiomatic and
deductive . . . objective and standardized . . . [and] static. It was implicitly based on a
paradigm of bargains made between strangers transacting on a perfect market. It was based
on a rational-actor model of psychology.”); see also Feinman, supra note 57, at 738 (“[A]s the
realm of consensual relations, contract law simply set ground rules for self-maximizing
private ordering.”).
59. See Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 812 (“Classical contract law was based on the
paradigm of strangers transacting on a perfect market[.]”).
60. Chapin F. Cimino, The Relational Economics of Commercial Contract, 3 TEX. A&M L.
REV. 91, 92 (2015); Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 653–54 (2010);
see Symposium, supra note 15, at 675.
61. See IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 10–11 (1980); Fox, supra note 57, at 9 (“[T]he primary insight of its
main theorist Ian Macneil, is that all contracts are relational. Contract is always a social act
involving multiple layers of relationships.”); Macneil, supra note 15, at 881 (“First, every
transaction is embedded in complex relations.”); Symposium, supra note 15, at 675.
62. See Campbell, supra note 50, at 41 (describing an arguable ambiguity regarding
whether any perfectly discrete exchanges are truly possible); see also Eisenberg, supra note 57,
at 821 (arguing that, because all contracts are relational, there can be no special, separate law
of contracts for relational contracts). While all contracts will have at least some minimal
relational components, Macneil describes, as an example of an as-if-discrete exchange, a spot
purchase of gasoline where the parties had not previously dealt with each other, nor would
they in the future. Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 720–21
(1974). This nuance regarding the extreme “discrete” end of the spectrum is not particularly
relevant to discussion of employment exchanges. In even the most discrete form of
transaction that could possibly be categorized as “employment,” (perhaps gig-work
providing intellectual services to a purchaser on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk) there will be
some minimal relational aspect. Questions about the level and types of relation necessary to
trigger the status of “employee” and the protections of employment law are discussed
further, infra Part III.
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transactions at one end, to highly relational, long-term, complex,
and interdependent transactions at the other end.63
The concept of a relationalist spectrum is based on Macneil’s
thinking on the “primal roots” of exchange between humans.64 He
observed that once any specialization of labor is introduced into
primal society, exchange necessarily follows; without exchange,
specialization would cease.65 Taking an extraordinarily broad view
of exchange and the purposes of exchange in human society,
Macneil argues that the root of all contract is social behavior.66 That
is: all contracts are motivated (seemingly in irrationally inconsistent
ways) partly by cooperation and partly by competition.67 Of course,
some contracts have stronger cooperative motivations at work than
others. Some contracts are so predominately motivated by
cooperation that, in the view of relationalists, classical contract law
is relatively ill-suited to govern them.68 Macneil generally insists on
stopping at this descriptive point,69 though his observations raise
obvious normative questions about how the law should respond, if
at all, to this observed phenomenon.
The normative implications for contract law are quite uncertain
and heavily debated by contracts scholars. Suggested possibilities
include viewing relational contract as a complete rival to classical
theory, such that all of contract law should be reoriented to focus
63. See MACNEIL, supra note 61, at 12–13; Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and
the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 763, 764 (1998) (describing the spectrum); Macneil,
supra note 15, at 894–98 (using the “as-if-discrete” language to describe the spectrum, and
noting that the concept is “[p]robably the most recognized aspect of my work in contract”).
64. Feinman, supra note 57, at 741 (“Macneil begins with the ‘primal roots of contract,’
and this beginning leads him to broad definitions of ‘contract’ and ‘exchange’ . . . .”); Cimino,
supra note 60, at 97.
65. See MACNEIL, supra note 61, at 2–3; Campbell, supra note 50, at 46–47; Ian R.
Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483, 485 (1985).
66. See Cimino, supra note 60, at 97.
67. See Campbell, supra note 50, at 49 (“The basic claim is that co-operation is an
integral part of any sort of society displaying an at all settled diversity of roles . . . .”); Cimino,
supra note 60, at 101 (“Relational contract theory takes it as a given that all exchange is both
competitive and cooperative. In this respect, exchange is unavoidably dualistic. Macneil
explained that exchange is unavoidably dualistic because human nature is dualistic.”).
68. See Campbell, supra note 50, at 18.
69. Macneil, supra note 15, at 894–99 (“I challenge to a duel anyone who, after this
notice, persists in converting my descriptions of relational contract law into prescriptions of
what the law should be, particularly prescriptions of some universal application of relational
contract law.”). Nonetheless, Macneil does go on to offer a carefully-limited general
prescription that “relational contract law should generally track the relational behavior and
norms found in the relations to which it applies.” Id. at 900.
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on analyzing the norms relevant to each individual relationship at
issue;70 applying a special set of relational contract standards to
those contracts falling toward the relational end of the
spectrum;71 making modest doctrinal changes (such as imposing
duties of good faith, looking to course of dealing, etc.) for all or
some contracts in recognition of their partly cooperative
motivation;72 or doing nothing.73 Some argue that there can be no
special contract law applicable to only relational contracts, because
distinguishing between relational and discrete contracts is
operationally impossible.74
For our purposes, we need not resolve this long-running debate
about the implications of relational theory for contract law. We are
concerned here with the theory’s implications for employment law,
an area of law that has already been—in fact, has always been—
singled out for special treatment apart from ordinary contract law.
Employment law is somewhat unique in this regard. As classical or
neoclassical contract law began to appear ill-suited to govern
certain types of agreements, several specialized sub-areas broke
away from general contract law and developed independently (e.g.,
commercial transactions, insurance, collective bargaining labor
relations, secured transactions).75
But employment law, with its historical roots in master-servant
common law, was status-based law from its origin; only later did
jurists infuse it with some classical contract ideas during the apex

70. Feinman, supra note 57, at 740–43 (presenting an account of “what a truly relational
contract law would look like”); see Leib, supra note 60, at 664 (“[M]ore thoroughgoing
relationalists . . . would have contract law develop a generalized law to apply to all or most
contracts, in light of their relational nature.”).
71. See Leib, supra note 60, at 664 (“[I]t is only one brand of the normative claim [of
relationalism] that seeks special treatment for a small class of relational contracts . . . .”).
72. Id. at 661–63 (noting that these reforms have largely already been accomplished by
the U.C.C. and refinements to the common law).
73. Cimino, supra note 60, at 91–92 (identifying the contradiction that “most legal
scholars accept the core insight” of relational contract theory, yet “many of these same
contract scholars believe that there is nothing contract law could or should do about it.”).
74. Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 817 (“There can be no special law of relational
contracts, because relational contracts and contracts are virtually one and the same.”). But
see Leib, supra note 60, at 665 (arguing that “Eisenberg fails to prove that there is no way to
operationalize a law of relational contracts” because he has not shown that standards, as
opposed to rules, are incapable of accomplishing the task).
75. See Campbell, supra note 50, at 7 (quoting Ian R. Macneil, Whither Contracts?, 21 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 403, 403 (1969)); Feinman, supra note 57, at 738–40.
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of the free labor contract movement.76 Employment law’s existence
as a separate field of law has always been justified by special aspects
of the employer-employee relationship. These aspects both set it
apart from the paradigmatic “as-if-discrete” exchanges and trigger
duties apart from those expressed in any manifestation of their
contractual agreement. Neoclassical contract law ideas and rules
have, of course, worked their way into the Restatement of
Employment Law, but they have never completely governed the
employment relationship. Quite the contrary, special status rules
formerly completely governed the employment relationship, and the
infusion of neoclassical contract concepts came later.
Return to the question at the outset of Part II: What is the
purpose of employment law generally? Whether one subscribes
primarily to an efficiency view, a bargaining power view, an equity
view, or a pluralistic view, my position here is that the partly
cooperative nature of the employment relation cannot be
completely ignored in any theoretical account of employment law.
If employment law is to continue as a separate legal field apart from
contract law, then the existence of cooperative motivations must
play some role in defining the purposes of employment law, and in
the resulting articulation of the rules or standards that will govern
the cases. My claim here is that no coherent articulation of first
principles of employment law, or any subfield of employment law,
can be advanced without proper regard for the degree of partly
cooperative, interdependent motivations that underlie the
employment relationship, as revealed by the key insight of
relational contract theory.77
In one sense, the claim that employment law must account for
the relational aspect of employment is really just a reminder that
employment law itself actually is relational contract law. I say
76. Marion Crain, supra note 43; Gordon, supra note 53, at 427–28 (“‘Contract’ in 1800,
generally referred to relations that the parties agreed to enter voluntarily, but that once
entered bound them to prescribed terms.”); Snyder, supra note 55, at 42 (“In the 19th century
employment law and contract law suddenly came together.”). The infusion was never
complete. Snyder observes that even at the height of the deployment of contractual rhetoric
in employment law cases during the Lochner era, “most employment law still turned on
questions of status, not contract.” Id. at 45.
77. See Macneil, supra note 15, at 898–99 (“This observation [that a great deal of
relational contract law, in fact, exists] does not mean that relational contracts can never be
dealt with by relatively discrete contract law. . . . It does mean, however that discrete contract
law can never be the beginning and the end of the law applicable to relational contracts.”).
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“reminder” because I am certainly not the first to note that
employment is a relational contract or that the field of employment
law is relational contract law.78 Macneil himself cited employment
and labor statutes as primary illustrative examples of relational
contract law.79 Professor Bird published Employment as a Relational
Contract in 2005.80 Stewart Schwab, in 1993, hypothesized that
certain exceptions to the at-will employment default rule might be
justified based on a “life cycle” model of career employment that
takes into account the longer-term relationship dynamics between
an employer and employee.81 If my claim here is just a reminder,
however, it is a warranted one. Rachel Arnow-Richman, in a recent
symposium on relational contracts, observed that in the field of
employment law disputed issues are often resolved as though
formal (neoclassical) contract rules applied, without reference to
the parties’ broader employment relationship.82 Despite the efforts
of Bird, Arnow-Richman, and others, most scholarly critiques of
current employment law generally are not grounded in relational
contract theory.83
But in an important sense, my claim here is more than just a
reminder. If the project of identifying the guiding normative
purpose(s) of employment law is ever to succeed, then the
successful account must acknowledge and accommodate the
cooperative motivation of employment relationships, and must

78. See sources cited supra note 15.
79. See Macneil, supra note 15, at 897. In his early work, Macneil expected to find his
relational contract insights in the existing literature stemming from the field of labor
relations, and found it in Philip Selznick’s Law Society and Industrial Justice (1969). See Ian R.
Macneil, Reflections on Relational Contract, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON.
541, 541 (1985). But see Eisenberg, supra note 57, at 820–21 (contending that the employment
statutes cited by Macneil, including the Act, do not actually constitute a form of
contract law).
80. Bird, supra note 15; see also Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied
Employment Contract, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 345, 395–99 (2008) (describing Bird’s
framework for application of relational contract principles to employment).
81. Schwab, supra note 24, at 11–13.
82. See Symposium, supra note 15, at 681 (“What you find in the employment context
is that, although relationships are extremely important to the parties, the legal issues that
arise often are not resolved in the manner you would expect. In fact, relatively little of
employment contract law follows a relational approach and reaches what we might consider
correct relational results.”).
83. See id. at 706 (Arnow-Richman observing: “While employment scholars . . . have
been critical of such decisions [applying traditional contract law], I think it is fair to say that
those critiques generally have not sounded in relational contract theory”).
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also recognize that the degree of cooperative motivation will
necessarily vary in different employment contexts. This recognition
would rule out a pure efficiency-based purpose for all of
employment law, which acknowledges no exceptions for the
influence of cooperative motivations. The microeconomic theory
that forms the basis of the economic efficiency normative
justification, and that also provides the template for any formal
economic modeling of competing legal rules, assumes selfinterested competition by rational utility maximizers under certain
stylized market conditions.84 More sophisticated economic
accounts that strive to model adjustments to assumptions of
rationality and perfect information will more closely approximate
a relational account, but these generally do not fully incorporate
cooperative motivations.85 Relational contract theory, as discussed
above, is rooted in the notion that exchanges—especially those
falling closer to the relational end of the discrete/relational
spectrum—are characterized by both competitive (“utility
maximizing”) and cooperative (“solidarity enhancing”)
motivations, thus undermining both the factual predictions and the
normative claims of the neoclassical economic model.86

84. See generally POSNER, supra note 26, at 3 (“As conceived in this book, economics is
the science of rational choice in a world—our world—in which resources are limited in
relation to human wants. The task of economics, so defined, is to explore the implications of
assuming that man is a rational maximizer of his ends in life, his satisfactions—what we shall
call his ‘self-interest.’”); Campbell, supra note 50, at 13 (“Neo-classical economics assumes
that rational economic action is motivated by a form of pure selfishness which it terms
rational individual utility maximization.”).
85 See Campbell, supra note 50, at 35 (Macneil argued that his relational theory tried to
capture a “sense of co-operation that will always escape even [Oliver E.] Williamson’s
reasoning from what remain neo-classical assumptions of individual utility maximization,
even though Williamson may attempt to model such co-operation in broadly gametheoretical, and increasingly complex . . .terms.”
86. See, e.g., Jay Fienman, The Reception of Ian Macneil’s Work on Contract in the USA, in
SELECTED WORKS OF IAN MACNEIL, supra note 41, at 62 (“[W]ealth maximization becomes
only one among many factors motivating people to engage in contractual relationships and
to be considered by courts in evaluating those relationships. . . . In the neo-classical view,
contracts are exchanges entered it to for gain. In the relational view, contracts are social
relationships in which economic gain is an important factor but, particularly in intertwined
relationships of long standing not the only factor.”) (citations omitted); Ian R. Macneil,
Exchange Revisited: Individual Utility and Social Solidarity, 96 ETHICS 567, 589 (1986) (“The
constant conflict between the utility maximizer and the solidarity enhancer in each person
always creates two-dimensional social relations. Any single-dimension model can have no
legitimate claims to social completeness. Thus typical utilitarian models purporting to be
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This is not to say that economic efficiency analysis is misguided.
Efficiency remains an important and worthy goal of employment
law. In some contexts, efficiency concerns may predominate over
competing goals suggested by partly-cooperative motivations,
leading legislation or doctrine to develop accordingly. Recognizing
the conflicting competitive and cooperative motivations of
actors in the labor market does not mean that economic analysis
offers no insight. It only requires that efficiency determinations
be placed into a larger relational context. The governing
principles of any subfield of employment law can be formulated
with an understanding of what neoclassical microeconomic
theory would prescribe as the efficiency-maximizing rule,
while maintaining flexibility to adopt an alternate rule if necessary,
in light of the cooperative motivations underlying the
employment relationship.87
Although not couched in terms of Macneil’s relational contract
theory, Befort and Budd describe the building blocks of their
pluralist model of employment in terms that would be quite
familiar to relational contract theorists:
The model of the pluralist employment relationship . . . assumes
that there are multiple parties (e.g., employers and employees)
with legitimate but sometimes conflicting interests—employers
might want lower labor costs, flexibility, and an intense pace of
work while employees might want higher wages, employment
security, and a safe workplace—as well as shared interests such

complete analyses of behavior—whether micro or macro—are not merely unsound at the
periphery, but at the center as well since the conflict in human nature itself is not logically
reconcilable within one consistent system.”).
87. Robert Bird demonstrated as much in analyzing the employment at-will doctrine
in the United States. While neoclassical microeconomic analysis suggests that the current atwill doctrine in the United States efficiently maximizes social welfare, see Epstein, supra note
24, at 976, 982, Bird points out that this efficiency-based conclusion can and ought to be
tempered by an understanding of relational contract principles. Bird, supra note 15, at 207–
08. He argues for a flexible “relational opportunism” standard in employment termination
cases that accounts for contract norms shaped by an employer’s promises and practices. Id.
at 196–208. This standard would prevent employers from taking advantage of employees’
information deficit regarding the discrepancy between the law of at-will employment and
the psychological employment contract created by an employer’s promises and practices. Id.;
see also Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of
Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 106 (1997) (finding that
employees broadly and mistakenly believe they are legally protected from termination by a
standard other than the at-will default rule).
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as quality products, productive workers, and profitable
companies.
...
Institutions and customs shape these interactions and are
therefore essential determinants of employment outcomes.88

Exactly how cooperative motivations and the contract norms of
an employment exchange should be taken into account is a difficult
question necessarily bound up in the context of the subfield of
employment law at issue and also in the specific employment
relationship at issue.89 Closer examination of the common contract
norms and external norms that guide and shape the parties’
behavior is required.90
B. Internal and External Norms
In relational contract theory, the specific facts of each exchange
relationship are “filtered through the structure of the relational
method,” including a consideration of common contract norms,91
as well as external norms. In Macneil’s account, certain contract
norms (such as the parties’ effectuation of consent) play a larger
role in more discrete contracts, while other norms (such as the
preservation of the relation) play a larger role in contracts falling
toward the relational end of the spectrum.92

88. BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 26, at 12–13. Befort and Budd’s reference to “institutions
and customs” may align well with the internal and external norms referenced by Professor
Macneil. Id.
89. See Feinman, supra note 57, at 742 (“Relational analysis is contextual with a
vengeance, immersing itself in the facts of the particular contract and of the contexts from
which it arises.”).
90. See Cimino, supra note 60, at 98 & n.25 (“[Macneil] called them norms because he
saw them as descriptions of the normal nature of all contract activity.”).
91. See Feinman, supra note 57, at 742. Macneil identified ten common contract norms,
including:
(1) role integrity (requiring consistency, involving internal conflict, and being
inherently complex), (2) reciprocity (simply stated as the principle of getting
something back for something given), (3) implementation of planning, (4)
effectuation of consent, (5) flexibility, (6) contractual solidarity, (7) the restitution,
reliance, and expectation interests (the ”linking norms”), (8) creation and restraint
of power (the ”power norm”), (9) propriety of means, and (10) harmonization with
the social matrix.
Ian R. Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 340, 347 (1983)
(footnote call numbers omitted).
92. Feinman, supra note 57, at 742.
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These internal contract norms play an important role in
interpreting the parties’ expectations and obligations under
relational contract theory. Macneil’s theory “includes the
possibility that norms internal to the parties’ relationship but not
clearly expressed in the agreement will become part of their
obligation to each other.”93 By definition, these norms will vary
with the circumstances of each employment exchange and can be
difficult to identify. But some generalization is possible where
many employment exchanges carry similar features. In the context
of job security, Robert Bird pointed to “psychological contracts,”94
“company credos” or “corporate codes,”95 and “organizational
cultures”96 as sources of internal relational contract norms.97 Given
the prevalence of corporate codes, credos, and employee
handbooks, a significant percentage of employment relations share
some similar (though not identical) internal norms.98
External norms also guide the parties’ behavior and
expectations. External norms are those imposed by the positive
laws of the sovereign, as well as the expectations imposed by trade
associations or customs.99 They are the larger social context against
93. Richard E. Speidel, The Characteristics and Challenges of Relational Contracts, 94 NW.
U. L. REV. 823, 827 (2000).
94. Bird defined psychological contracts as “an employee’s perception of the mutual
obligations that exist between the employee and her employer. Not contracts in the legal
sense, psychological contracts emerge when an employee perceives that contributions she
makes obligate her employer to reciprocal acts.” Bird, supra note 15, at 165 (footnote call
numbers omitted).
95. A company credo or code “is a document developed by an organization that
expresses that organization’s values and the ethical rules it expects employees to follow.” Id.
at 170.
96. Bird defined corporate culture as “internal consistency within an organization that
influences the behavior and values of its employees. . . . A corporate culture represents the
cumulative philosophies, beliefs, values, assumptions, and norms of an organization.” Id. at
180–81 (internal footnote citations omitted). More colloquially, a corporate culture is a
“feeling in the organization, to rules of the game, to how things are done around here.” Id.
at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Alan M. Wilson, Understanding
Organizational Culture and the Implications for Corporate Meetings, 35 EUR. J. MARKETING 353,
355 (2001)).
97. See id. at 165–85.
98. See id.
99. Macneil, supra note 91, at 367–68 (“[External social values] would also have to
include private law, such as that imposed on professional football teams by league rules, on
businesses by trade associations, on colleges and universities by the American Association
of University Professors, and on family life by churches. Furthermore, it could not stop with
relatively hierarchical or vertical impositions such as those listed. It also would have to deal
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which the exchange is entered into by the parties, which helps
shape the parties’ relational expectations.100
The sources, contours, and roles of external and internal norms
will vary with the circumstances of each individual employment
exchange. And they will also vary when ascertaining employer or
employee obligations in each of the subfields that make up the
mishmash of employment law, including the at-will termination
default rule, employee mobility restrictions, employee intellectual
property, workplace privacy, workplace safety, employment
discrimination, employee speech, wage and hour regulation, and
so on. The next subpart draws on relational contract theory (as well
as other sources) to identify anti-opportunism as a potential
guiding principle in the subfield of worker safety law.
C. An Anti-Opportunism Principle
A signature characteristic of relationalism is the need to
examine individual exchanges within their own context, including
the internal and external norms guiding the parties’ behavior.101 In
doing so, relationalists look to prevent or deter opportunism by the
parties to the exchange.102 Macneil defined “opportunism” as “selfinterest seeking contrary to the principles of the relation in which it
occurs.”103 Robert Bird, examining opportunism in the context of
job security, defined “relational opportunism” as “self-interest
seeking that contradicts the terms of an established relational
contract.”104 As an example of relational opportunism, Bird pointed
to an employer who encourages loyalty with implicit (though not
with more horizontal imposition of external values, such as those arising from customs—not
only those customs of closely related people or groups, such as customs of a trade, but also
customs of broader origin, such as those of civilized intercourse in the particular society.”);
see also Campbell, supra note 50, at 14; Feinman, supra note 57, at 742.
100. See Macneil, supra note 91, at 367–68.
101. See Feinman, supra note 57.
102. Speidel, supra note 93, at 838 (“Both relationalists and transaction-cost economists
recognize the importance of preventing opportunism in relational contracts. . . . In short,
opportunism threatens the relationship. If the contract does not have a governance structure
to regulate or define opportunism, or if that structure fails and the parties cannot agree, a
court may be asked to intervene.”). For an argument that precontractual commercial
negotiations ought to be protected by a legal claim proscribing opportunistic behavior, see
G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a
New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221 (1991).
103. Bird, supra note 15, at 198 n.383 (quoting Macneil, supra note 2, at 1024 n.20).
104. Id. at 198.
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contractually-binding) promises that an employee’s job is secure
and that the employee will be treated fairly, but who “then retracts
that security and fair treatment when they prove inconvenient.”105
Other scholars, outside the self-described relationalists, have
also identified the prevention of opportunism as a desirable goal
for employment law. Matthew Bodie, drawing on the economic
theory of the firm and its modern variants, argues that the
discretion lodged in both employers and employees over certain
aspects of the employment relationship within a firm creates
possibilities for opportunistic behavior.106 Bodie contends that,
where employees have little say in governance, “they have no way
to address the employer’s discretion, their own vulnerability to that
discretion, and the opportunism and agency costs inherent in the
relationship.”107 Noting Professor Bird’s similar arguments drawn
from relational contract theory, Bodie urges a type of fiduciary
duty—a “duty not to use its discretion to take undue advantage of
employees, either individually or as a group.”108
The heavily relational character of employment contracts,
together with the areas of discretion built-in to modern firm
structures, present a heightened risk of opportunism in
employment. Many of the special common law and statutory duties
(running in both directions) that permeate employment law can be
best explained as rules designed to anticipate and defeat forms
of opportunism by employers or employees. Both Professors Bird
and Bodie focused primarily on job security and the at-will
employment rule in analyzing the potential for opportunism
in employment exchanges,109 but the law of workplace safety
likewise ought to reflect this basic anti-opportunism principle.

105. Id. at 199.
106. See Bodie, supra note 52, at 864.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Bird, supra note 15 at 196–200; Bodie, supra note 52, at 864. Professor Schwab’s
life-cycle theory likewise focused on the possibility of opportunism in the context of job
security, the at-will employment rule, and courts’ willingness to scrutinize terminations at
points in the employment life cycle that seemed most vulnerable to the possibility of
opportunistic behavior by employers. See Schwab, supra note 24, at 39 (“Courts are most
likely to scrutinize firings at the beginning and end of the life cycle. Courts do not get
involved during midcareer unless they see an obvious case of particular opportunism, such
as a firing before a pension vests or a sales commission is due.”).
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The next Part considers the implications of the anti-opportunism
purpose for OSHA.
IV. BEYOND THE EFFICIENCY JUSTIFICATION IN WORKPLACE SAFETY:
ANTI-OPPORTUNISM AND ITS COROLLARIES
This Part narrows the focus from employment law generally to
workplace safety law specifically. The few scholars that have
brought relational contract theory to bear on employment law have
focused on the at-will employment rule. Those works have either
not touched on workplace safety at all, or have considered it only
briefly in passing.110 My focus on workplace safety law is motivated
in part by recent and anticipated changes in the landscape of
workplace safety regulation, including potential challenges to
OSHA’s expansive approach to the general duty clause along the
lines urged by Judge Kavanaugh.111
This Part begins by briefly exploring the dominant efficiency
analysis approach to workplace safety law. It then lays out an
alternative, anti-opportunism view, sketching a set of corollaries
informed by relationalism.
A. The Efficiency Account of Workplace Safety Law
As with other subfields of employment law, the scholarship on
workplace safety is currently dominated by the economic efficiency

110. While not claiming to apply relational theory, Befort and Budd do briefly consider
the implications of their pluralist approach for workplace safety and health law. See BEFORT
& BUDD, supra note 26, at 162–63. Likewise, Bodie, examining employment through the lens
of the theory of the firm rather than relational contract, identifies certain employer duties to
employees in the subfield of workplace safety that resemble fiduciary duties. See Bodie, supra
note 52, at 837–38 (claiming employers have a common law duty to provide a reasonably
safe workplace, and OSHA supplementation of that duty through the general duty clause).
111. See Gonzalez, supra note 10 (“[T]he agency is more actively relying on the
Occupational Safety and Health Act’s general duty clause to cite industries for violations
where there is no specific standard, such as ergonomics, workplace violence and heat
stress/illness hazards.”). The current presidential administration’s deregulatory emphasis
may limit OSHA’s approach to the general duty clause. See generally Exec. Order No. 13,771,
82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Jan. 30, 2017); Collin Warren, The OSHA Story Under Trump, LAW 360 (Mar.
21, 2017, 11:20 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/902113/the-osha-story-undertrump (emphasizing deregulation and requiring the elimination of two rules for every
rule enacted).
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paradigm and economic analysis.112 With some notable exceptions,
critiques to the orthodox law-and-economics prescriptions are
usually couched in later-generation economic terms, including the
identification of market failures, externalities, transaction costs,
information asymmetries, and behavioral economics or boundedrationality critiques.113
The efficiency-maximizing account of worker safety regulation
is as follows. Workers and employers freely enter into employment
contracts where workers exchange their labor and their time for
wages and benefits. Express or implicit in these contracts is an
acknowledgement that workers are agreeing to expose themselves
to certain risks of the job. Workers receive compensating wage
differentials in return for taking on risk. And risk-preferring
workers can seek out those employers who would rather pay wage
differentials than incur greater expenses to reduce risks. By
matching the risk preferences of workers with appropriate
employers, the free market maximizes efficiency in labor
exchanges. Only where a systematic market failure is identified
should the government intervene—and then, only in the manner

112. See, e.g., CHRISTINE JOLLS, Employment Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 1349, 1355 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); W. KIP VISCUSI,
RISK BY CHOICE: REGULATING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE WORKPLACE (1983); Henry N.
Butler & Keith W. Chauvin, Economic Analysis of Labor Markets: A Framework for Analyzing
Employment Law Issues, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (1998); Lambert, supra note 13; Jonathan S.
Masur & Eric A. Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2010); Walter Y.
Oi, On the Economics of Industrial Safety, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 669 (1974); Sunstein, supra
note 14; W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1423, 1436 (1996) (“The
most comprehensive regulatory test from an economic efficiency standpoint is benefit-cost
analysis.”).
113. See, e.g., Charlotte S. Alexander, Transmitting the Costs of Unsafe Work, 54 AM. BUS.
L.J. 463, 465 (2017); Charlotte S. Alexander, Transparency and Transmission: Theorizing
Information’s Role in Regulatory and Market Responses to Workplace Problems, 48 CONN. L. REV.
177 (2015); Jason R. Bent, Health Theft, 48 CONN. L. REV. 637 (2016); Martha T. McCluskey, The
Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation “Reform”, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 723–24 (1998);
Sidney A. Shapiro, The Necessity of OSHA, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 22 (1999). But see David
M. Driesen, Two Cheers for Feasible Regulation: A Modest Response to Masur and Posner, 35 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (2011) (arguing that distributional considerations are a rational
justification for application of a feasibility standard, rather than an efficiency-maximizing
cost-benefit standard, under the Act); Sidney A. Shapiro, Dying at Work: Political Discourse
and Occupational Safety and Health, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 831, 841–46 (2014) (arguing that
the dominance of cost-benefit analysis undermines the democratic goal of protecting
workers as a social objective).
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minimally necessary to correct the identified market failure.114
Accordingly, some efficiency-minded scholars have advocated (for
example) that OSHA standards be opt-out standards, because the
only identified market failure is one of inadequate information in
the possession of workers, which can be corrected with an
information-forcing opt-out standard.115
Regarding compensation post-injury, the efficiencymaximizing account posits that the likelihood of recovering all or a
portion of any loss due to injury or illness will be factored into the
market price for risky work and will also be factored into the
employer’s willingness to pay for precautions. If a worker
expects that, upon injury, she will automatically receive 67% of her
lost wages, plus the full payment of medical expenses, in a typical
no-fault workers’ compensation regime, she will adjust her
demand for compensating wages accordingly. On the other hand,
if recovery of the losses against the employer were unlikely, as it
would be in a tort regime following strong versions of the
traditional Unholy Trinity defenses,116 then she will demand
appropriately higher wages to compensate her for the risk of
incurring an injury that would leave her with no legal
recourse. Employers should theoretically take precautions up to the
point at which the marginal cost of additional precautions
equals the marginal benefit in reduced liability or reduced
insurance premiums.117
The foregoing efficiency-maximizing account of the worker
safety exchange is often buttressed by empirical evidence
suggesting that workers do, in fact, receive some compensating

114. JOLLS, supra note 112, at 1357 (“The general starting point for economic analysis of
workplace safety regulation is the observation that in the absence of market failure, less safe
working conditions should be fully compensated by higher wages—an application of the
theory of equalizing wage differentials.”); Thomas A. Lambert, supra note 13, at 1008
(arguing that, for an information asymmetry market failure, the proper response is not to
ban the exchange, but rather to narrowly address the information problem directly by
requiring information disclosure).
115. See Lambert, supra note 13, at 1070–71, 1078.
116. The Unholy Trinity defenses included the fellow-servant rule, assumption of the
risk, and contributory negligence. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in
Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1769 (1981).
117. See Lambert, supra note 13, at 1018–19.
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wage differential for certain riskier jobs. The empirical evidence on
that point, though, is far from conclusive.118
B. Beyond Efficiency: A Relational Account of the Risk Exchange
Relational contract theory offers an alternative way to think
about workplace safety laws. A relational account of workplace
safety begins by returning to examine the fundamental roots of the
exchange at issue and then understanding the contract norms that
have developed internally or externally to guide the participants’
expectations in that exchange.119 In the employment exchange, one
party trades his or her labor to another party who is able to pay for
it and has the capital necessary to put the labor to productive use.
A careful exploration of the fundamental components, the
motivations, and the internal and external norms of the
employment exchange will help illuminate this account.
1. Health is property
In understanding the occupational risk exchange, the first thing
to recognize—frequently overlooked in the literature—is that an
employee’s health is the employee’s property.120 The employment
exchange is not just an employee agreeing to exchange her time and
her labor efforts in return for wages and/or benefits, but also
118. Compare W. Kip Viscusi, Regulating the Regulators, supra note 112, at 40–41 (finding
the existence of compensating wage premiums), with Shapiro, The Necessity of OSHA, supra
note 113, at 24 (“[T]he literature on wage premiums offers only equivocal support that wage
premiums are adequate to compensate workers for their occupational risks or that they even
exist.”), and Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work Revisited,
52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 116 (1998) (questioning the variables included in several empirical
studies of wage differentials).
119. The discussion of external and internal norms that follows makes a typical
assumption that even more fundamental basic societal norms (sometimes called first and
second level norms) recognized by Macneil are satisfied. See Campbell, supra note 50, at 12–
13, 43. These norms require that the parties have shared language or meaning, such that
forming an exchange is possible, and that they experience a shared social solidarity, such
that they can expect general social peace (rather than simple violence allowing one party to
impose its will on another) and some mechanism for the enforcement of promises. See id.
120. Macneil notes that the existence of defined property rights is a critical prerequisite
to effective exchange. Macneil, supra note 65, at 491 (“We know that property, the
prerequisite of discrete exchange, was the legal fundament throughout the period [1865–
1933], followed closely by liberty, at least insofar as the sale of labor was concerned.”). That
an employee has a property interest in his or her health appears to be implicit in the theory
of compensating wage differentials, but it is nonetheless often overlooked once attention
turns to prescribing appropriate legal rules to govern workplace safety.
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involves a health risk exchange. The employee gives not only her
leisure time and her labor efforts, but also agrees to bear a risk to
her health that she was otherwise under no obligation to assume.
Risks to the employee’s health constitute one of the commodities
being exchanged as part of the overall employment bargain
between the parties. Recognition of the role of the employee’s
health as property in this health risk exchange becomes important
as we explore the unstated, implied contractual obligations of
the parties.
2. Both competitive and cooperative motivations
The health risk component of the exchange between the
employee and employer is complex, including both competitive
and cooperative motivations. As Macneil emphasized, this seeming
inconsistency in pursuing both competitive and cooperative goals
is just a reflection of the irrational duality of human nature in
pursuing both social and individualistic goals simultaneously.121
The competitive motivations in the risk exchange are apparent.
An employee will seek to undertake less risk to his health on the
job, all else held constant. Factoring in an individual employee’s
risk preferences,122 competitive motivations will lead the employee
to pursue the optimal mix of low safety risk with high wages or
benefits received in return for his work. Employers, on the other
hand, are generally motivated to reduce production costs and
maximize profits, which may impose increased risks on the
employee’s health.123
Line speeds at poultry or meat processing plants offer a modern
illustration of competitive motivations.124 Employees will generally
prefer slower processing line speeds, all else held constant, because
they are safer. Employers will prefer faster line speeds, all else held
constant, because they would reduce production time and labor

121. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
122. Any given employee may be risk-neutral, risk-averse, or risk-preferring. A
relatively risk-averse employee will choose a mix that prioritizes safety, even at the cost of
somewhat reduced wages.
123. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 26, at 11–12 (“[E]mployers might want lower labor
costs, flexibility, and an intense pace of work while employees might want higher wages,
employment security, and a safe workplace . . . .”).
124. See generally SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER, Unsafe at These Speeds (Mar. 01,
2013), https://www.splcenter.org/20130228/unsafe-these-speeds.
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costs, maximizing profits. The interests of employee and employer,
specifically regarding the occupational safety risks to employees,
are in direct opposition to each other.
But cooperative motivations are present as well, undercutting
some critical assumptions of efficiency theory. First, employees and
employers both want the company to profit and succeed.
Employers, so that investors will maximize their return on
investment. Employees, so that the company will be stable,
providing a predictable opportunity to continue working and
perhaps also an opportunity to share in the company’s success
through improved wages or benefits. Because of these shared
motivations, both employers and employees in the business of
processing poultry have an incentive to produce safe, reputable,
high-quality products. If line speeds are too fast, unsafe food
products may escape detection, enter the distribution chain, and
sicken consumers, threatening profits and perhaps the survival of
the company and the continued employment opportunity.125
Employers also have an interest in keeping their employees healthy
and avoiding excessive injuries or illnesses. Replacing an injured or
ill employee can introduce additional training costs, monitoring
costs, or other uncertainties.
Relational contract theory acknowledges the simultaneous and
seemingly contradictory existence of both competitive and
cooperative motivations in all contracts. More discrete contracts
tend to be dominated by competitive motivations, while more
relational contracts tend to be characterized by significant
cooperative motivations.
3. Evolving external norms
External norms about employers’ obligations in workplace
safety (both in prevention and compensation) have been quite
unstable over the last three centuries. Understanding the historical
evolution of these external norms helps to situate the current
uncertainty simmering in workplace safety law.
In seventeenth and eighteenth century England, the
responsibility of caring for individuals rendered unable to work

125. See BEFORT & BUDD, supra note 26, at 12 (providing examples of “shared interests
such as quality products, productive workers, and profitable companies”).
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due to injury fell to the local parishes under the Poor Law.126 The
English Poor Laws were the primary influence on the treatment of
the poor in the American colonies.127 This meant that in many
colonies, religious groups took on the responsibility of caring for
the poor, including injured or ill workers.128 In the American South,
private landowners often provided local poor assistance.129 Parish
or town responsibility for the injured underpinned Lord
Mansfield’s reasoning in 1784, in determining that a master was not
legally liable to care for a sick or injured servant.130
Lord Mansfield contrasted the parish’s legal responsibility with
another common avenue of potential relief for an injured worker —
an employer’s benevolence. While not legally obligated to provide
for the injured servant, Lord Mansfield believed that masters
morally “ought to,” and they often did.131 The moral norm reflected
in Lord Mansfield’s reasoning pre-dated the free labor movement
and its importation of classical contract ideas into the masterservant relationship. According to Christopher Tomlins, legal
126. See Michael Ashley Stein, Victorian Tort Liability for Workplace Injuries, 2008 U. ILL.
L. REV. 933, 942 (2008) (“Responsibility for medical care traditionally fell upon parishes
through the aegis of the Old (meaning, pre-1834) Poor Law . . . .”); Christopher L. Tomlins,
A Mysterious Power: Industrial Accidents and the Legal Construction of Employment Relations in
Massachusetts, 1800-1850, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 375, 396 (1988) (quoting Lord Mansfield in Newby
v. Wiltshire (1784)). When a servant was injured or had fallen ill outside of the servant’s home
parish, the parish where the worker had become injured or ill was generally required to
provide care until the servant could be “removed” to the servant’s own parish. See Stein,
supra at 942.
127. See William P. Quigley, Work or Starve: Regulation of the Poor in Colonial America, 31
U.S.F. L. REV. 35, 42–43 (1996) (“While individual economic and social circumstances shaped
each colony’s response to its poor, the English poor laws were usually the frame of reference
for local action.”).
128. See id. at 47 (“Poor relief was accepted as a prime responsibility of religious groups
in many parts of the United States. Private church aid existed parallel to the systems later
created and maintained by the public authorities.”).
129. See id. (explaining that Southern landowners were motivated, in part, by a desire
to maintain a social system akin to feudalism).
130. Newby v. Wiltshire, 2 Esp. 739, 742, 170 Eng. Rep. 515, 516 (K.B.1784) (“I think, in
general, a master ought to maintain his servants, and take care of them in sickness; but the
question now is, what is the law? There is, in point of law, no action against the master to
compel him to repay the parish for the cure of his servant; no authority whatsoever has been
cited, and it seems to me that it cannot be. The parish is bound to take care of accidents . . . .”).
131. See id. Some other eighteenth century cases did recognize a master’s duty to pay
medical expenses in some cases. See Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort
Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641, 701, n.370 (1989); Tomlins, supra note 126, at 396. As Professor
Schwartz notes, the “availability of the parish or town as an alternative bearer of liability for
disabled and impoverished workers greatly complicates the effort to understand what these
early cases and legal rules were all about.” Schwartz, supra at 701, n.370.
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historians “have generally agreed that a paternalistic sense of social
responsibility or ‘stewardship’ was a key component of early
corporate ideology.”132
By the late 1830s and the 1840s, however, an injured employee’s
likelihood of recovering more than the “merest pittance” in
corporate benevolence had dwindled.133 Tomlins ascribes this
development to the “growing emphasis upon profit and
productivity,” i.e., the “political economy of speed” that prevailed
in the 1830s and 1840s.134 Injured or sick workers took to the courts
seeking legal recourse, resulting in the earliest American cases
seeking to impose liability on employers for injuries to
employees.135 The expected value of any post-injury benevolence
disappeared after employees had already invested in this
occupational risk exchange with certain expectations about the
employer’s benevolence. This was classic opportunistic behavior
by employers in the face of rising profit pressures. In response,
employees began pursuing civil tort actions. Initially, these suits
were met with jurists importing classical contract ideas—built upon
a model of purely competitive motivations—into traditional
master-servant law. The fellow servant rule, applied in Farwell v.
Boston & Worcester R.R., is the most notable example.136 At this
point, the employment exchange began to be characterized as just
another contract.137
The struggle to establish a new external norm of legal
responsibility (rather than just moral responsibility) for
workplace injuries played out in the judicial creation of several
ad hoc exceptions to the fellow servant rule, including the “safe
tools, safe worksite, competent servant, constructive knowledge,

132. See Tomlins, supra note 126, at 399.
133. See id. at 400.
134. See id.
135. See id.; see also infra note 154 (discussing the first such case, Barnes v. Boston &
Worcester R.R. Corp.).
136. Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. 49 (1842). The fellow servant rule
held that an employee injured on the job could not recover in tort against his employer if the
injury was caused by the negligence of a co-employee or “fellow servant.” See also Lawrence
M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 50, 56 (1967) (“Shaw’s opinion [in Farwell] makes extreme assumptions about behavior,
justified only by a philosophy of economic individualism. . . . Shaw’s generation placed an
extremely high value on economic growth.”).
137. See supra note 76.
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and extraordinary risks” exceptions, as well as the “vice
principal (or superior servant), the different department, and
the subcontractor” exceptions.138 All of these permitted workers,
in certain circumstances, to escape the harsh consequences of
the Farwell fellow servant rule and recover against their
employer. These exceptions grew out of a rediscovery of the
employer’s old status-based duties under master-servant common
law to provide a reasonably safe workplace and to warn employees
of dangerous conditions.139
The common law did not quickly settle on a stable new external
norm for occupational risk exchanges.140 Exceptions to the fellow
servant rule were applied unevenly and inconsistently.141 The
increasing number of tort suits and the unruly exceptions led some
jurists to advocate for workers’ compensation legislation.142
Eventually, in the prevailing historical account, workers and
employers alike were sufficiently frustrated with the

138. PETER KARSTEN, HEART VERSUS HEAD 5, 120–24 (1997) (citing exceptions to the
fellow servant rule as examples of innovative instrumentalist jurisprudence “finding ways
around an obnoxious rule or, indeed, of . . . changing it in order for those victims to emerge
victorious”). See also Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 136, at 59–62 (1967) (arguing that, by
the latter part of the nineteenth century, judges began to reject Farwell’s reasoning and began
developing “scores” of doctrinal exceptions to the rule).
139. See, e.g., Cleveland, C. & C.R. Co. v. Keary, 3 Ohio St. 201, 209–10 (Ohio 1854)
(“When one enters his employment in a subordinate situation, and agrees to be subject to his
orders, either directly or indirectly given, he has a right to expect that his employer will
perform the duty resting upon him, to furnish suitable machinery, and control it with care
and prudence.”); see also RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.05 (AM. LAW INST. 2015);
Bodie, supra note 52, at 838 (describing the common law roots of these duties).
140. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 136, at 65 (“The common law doctrines were
designed to preserve a certain economic balance in the community. When the courts and
legislatures created numerous exceptions, the rules lost much of their efficiency as a
limitation on the liability of businessmen.”). Friedman and Ladinsky’s reference to a “certain
economic balance in the community” likely reflects an unstated but understood external
norm about the allocation of risks of injury as between an employee and an employer. In
addition to common law exceptions, the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908 eliminated
the fellow servant rule for railroads. See 35 Stat. 65 (1908); Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note
136, at 64–65. State legislation was also making inroads. John Fabian Witt reports that “[b]y
1911 twenty-five states had enacted legislation variously abolishing the fellow servant rule,
modifying the contributory negligence doctrine, and limiting the assumption of risk rule.”
JOHN FABIAN WITT, THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC 67 (2004).
141. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 136, at 65 (“The rules prevented many plaintiffs
from recovering, but not all; a few plaintiffs recovered large verdicts. There were costs of
settlements, costs of liability insurance, costs of administration, legal fees and the salaries of
staff lawyers. . . . It was desirable to be able to predict costs and insure against fluctuating,
unpredictable risks.”).
142. Id. at 67–68.
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unpredictability of litigation that support grew on both sides for
no-fault workers’ compensation systems, which are now nearly
universal.143 Social norms had come a long way from the mere
moral employer obligation that Lord Mansfield recognized, and the
“Grand Bargain” of workers’ compensation grew out of the
resulting instability.
External norms imposed by sovereign law continued to evolve,
beginning with protections for children, industry-specific laws, and
state laws that regulated some workplaces.144 In 1970, the federal
Act was signed into law.145 The Act’s general duty clause, by its
terms, was both broader and narrower than the analogous common
law master-servant duty.146 Broader, because the Act is not
governed by the common law’s negligence (reasonableness)

143. See id. at 68–69 (“When considerations of politics were added to those of business
economics and industrial peace, it was not surprising to find that businessmen gradually
withdrew their veto against workmen’s compensation statutes. They began to say that a
reformed system was inevitable—and even desirable.”). See also WITT, supra note 140, at 4
(“By the beginning of 1920, compensation systems . . . were in place in forty-two states and
three U.S. territories, replacing a wide swath of nineteenth-century common law with
compulsory state-administered insurance regimes.”). While some type of reform in response
to the “industrial accident crisis” might have been inevitable by the early 1900s, Witt argues
that the particular reform adopted in nearly all U.S. jurisdictions was by no means inevitable;
indeed, it was “accidental.” See id. at 20–21 (“[W]e experimented with a wide array of
plausible alternatives in remaking American law for the modern world, each of which
represented different paths that American lawmakers might have taken into the twentieth
century. In turn, the paths ultimately taken were the contingent outcomes of encounters
between these alternatives and the cultures, institutions, and individual men and women of
American law.”).
144. See generally Marjorie E. Gross, The Occupational Safety & Health Act: Much Ado
About Something, 3 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 247, 248 nn.4–5 (1972) (describing the history of
occupational safety laws leading up to passage of the Act).
145. See generally Nina G. Stillman & John R. Wheeler, The Expansion of Occupational
Safety and Health Law, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 969 (1987) (providing a historical account of
the development of OSHA, workers’ compensation, and other components of workplace
safety law).
146. See Richard S. Miller, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and the Law of
Torts, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 612, 616 (1974) (“At common law the employer was obliged
only to exercise ordinary care to make his workplace safe for his employees.”). Some
evidence in the legislative history suggests that lawmakers may have thought the general
duty clause was coextensive with common law duties. See id. at 621–23 nn.63–65 (citing both
Senate and House reports suggesting that the general duty clause imposes common law
duties). See generally Richard S. Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 86 HARV. L. REV. 988, 1003 (1973) (noting the OSHRC’s rejection of the
common law unholy trinity defenses when considering the general duty clause).
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standard.147 The Act requires a workplace “free from [certain]
recognized hazards.”148 Narrower, because the Act does not
regulate unrecognized hazards, nor hazards imposing risks of
only minor injuries. Only recognized hazards “likely to cause death
or serious physical harm” trigger violations of the Act’s general
duty clause.149
4. Context-specific internal norms and opportunism
Employers generate internal norms about job security through
corporate policies, credos, culture, and handbooks.150 These
internal norms have been effective, resulting in a widespread
erroneous perception by many employees that they are protected
by something other than the at-will employment rule.151
Similar internal norms are likely at play in worker safety.
Corporate credos, codes, and culture often emphasize the primary
importance of safety. As just one example, ExxonMobil’s CEO
stated, in 2015, that safety “must be more than a priority, it must be
a value—a core value that shapes decision-making all the time, at
every level.”152 An emphasis on safety in company rules, standards,
and procedures is “not enough;” instead, the “answer is ultimately
found in a company’s culture—the unwritten standards and norms
that shape mindsets, attitudes, and behaviors.”153 Messages like
these can shape the parties’ understandings of their respective
rights and obligations in the exchange.
But formal corporate policies can be used opportunistically by
employers to override unwritten, prevailing internal norms and
customs after an accident occurs. Tomlins provides an early, vivid
example of just this sort of opportunistic employer behavior in a
nineteenth century railroad case, Barnes v. Boston & Worcester R.R.
147. See Nat’l Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n,
489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that the statutory duty, unlike the common
law, “was not characterized in terms of reasonableness”); Miller, supra note 146, at 616.
148. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2012).
149. Id.
150. See Bird, supra note 15, at 165–85.
151. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker
Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 110 (1997–98).
152. Darren W. Woods, Chairman and CEO, Exxon Mobile, Building a Culture of Safety
(Apr. 9, 2015) (transcript available at http://corporate.exxonmobil.com/en/company/
news-and-updates/speeches/building-a-culture-of-safety).
153. Id. (emphasis added).
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Corp.154 Barnes was hired to perform maintenance work on bridges
and was injured, leading to the loss of his arm, in an accident that
occurred while he was riding the “gravel train” (which apparently
had cracked wheels) to accompany work materials to the bridge
where he planned to “jump off and join his workmen.”155 In the
resulting litigation, the railroad took the position that an implied
aspect of the employment contract was that no workers were
“allowed to use the gravel train other than the gang of laborers
specifically assigned to it.”156 Workers were to use the first car of
the passenger train, and “if Barnes had chosen to ride on the gravel
train he had done so at his own risk.”157 Despite the stated company
policy, Barnes presented witnesses who testified that they also rode
the gravel train under circumstances similar to those facing Barnes,
apparently with the consent of the railroad.158 The arguments in
Barnes illustrate that the parties’ understanding of the occupational
risk exchange ought to consider not only formal pronouncements
and policies about the risk exchange, but also the actual day-to-day
practice and customs of the parties.
Internal norms will, by definition, vary on a case-by-case basis,
but a relational view of the occupational risk exchange counsels to
carefully consider how these internal norms shape the parties’
expectations. Internal norms help shape the parties’
understandings of their individual rights and obligations in the
exchange and can reduce the transaction costs that would
otherwise accompany formal contracting between an employer and
employee on every possible anticipated factual scenario. Internal
norms will often reflect the influence of cooperative motivations
underlying the occupational risk exchange.

154. Barnes is an unreported case from the Suffolk County Court of Common Pleas,
October Term 1837. See Tomlins, supra note 126, at 376–77 & n.4; see also John Fabian Witt,
The Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, 1842-1910, 107 YALE L.J. 1467,
1479 n.66 (1998). Tomlins notes that Barnes was the “first in a flood of suits alleging that
employers were legally obliged to compensate employees for injuries arising in the course
of their employment that came before American courts in the quarter century prior to the
Civil War.” Tomlins, supra note 126, at 377.
155. See Tomlins, supra note 126, at 376.
156. Id. at 401.
157. Id.
158. Id. Tomlins describes the testimony as showing that the railroad’s “‘rule’ was less
than prescriptive in practice.” Id.
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C. Anti-Opportunism Corollaries for Workplace Law
What does anti-opportunism look like in practice for workplace
safety regulation? What are its core prescriptions? This subpart
addresses these questions by developing a short list of corollaries
flowing from the fundamental anti-opportunism principle that
employment regulations ought to be used to defeat opportunistic
behavior by employers or employees.
A relational account of worker safety recognizes that, in
employment relationships, the parties’ significant cooperative
motivations suggest a baseline level of trust that requires both
parties to act in good faith regarding risks. One of the commonlysuggested normative prescriptions growing out of relational
contract theory is imposing a meaningful duty of good faith in
contracts falling toward the relational end of the spectrum.159 A
meaningful duty of good faith makes an obvious starting point
for anti-opportunism in workplace safety, but it does not go
far enough.
Professor Bodie has argued that employment relationships are
and should be imbued with more than simply a contractual good
faith duty; rather, he recommends something more like a fiduciary
duty.160 Whether owing to Professor Macneil’s relational contract
theory or to the quasi-fiduciary duties that Professor Bodie
identifies as flowing from the structure of modern firms, a basic set
of anti-opportunism corollaries governing workplace safety can be
articulated, as follows:
Anti-Opportunism Corollaries for Worker Safety Law:
A. Employers and employees owe obligations not to
engage in opportunistic behavior that deprives the other
of the benefit of the occupational risk exchange, taking
159. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
160. See Matthew T. Bodie, Employment as Fiduciary Relationship, 105 GEO. L.J. 819, 854
(2017) (“Both employees and the employer have a set of mutual interests that differentiate
employment from other contractual relationships. And the employment relationship gives
both employees and the employer discretion over aspects of the relationship that allow for
opportunism. The employer—as legal entity, and as aggregate of the individuals who
comprise the employer—has relational responsibilities similar to fiduciary duties. Therefore,
it makes sense to characterize the employment relationship as a whole as fiduciary, and the
employer as a fiduciary of its employees.”).
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into account both the external and internal norms
guiding that exchange.
An employer owes a fiduciary obligation to reasonably
investigate and understand the safety and health risks
presented by the working conditions of its employees.
An employer owes a fiduciary obligation to disclose all
relevant information about these safety and health risks
to employees and prospective employees, including an
obligation to warn of any specific, nonobvious or
complex risks.
Employees owe a fiduciary obligation to reasonably
inform the employer of any safety and health
risks which may not be known or understood by
the employer.
An employer owes a fiduciary obligation to not subject
their employees to unnecessarily dangerous working
conditions that most reasonable employees would reject
in light of their terms of employment.
Employees owe a fiduciary obligation to take care in the
performance of their duties.

This set of substantive anti-opportunism obligations extends
beyond the formal contractual obligations in typical employment
exchanges. And the obligations are fundamentally contrary to the
presumption underlying the strong version of Farwell’s fellow
servant rule and the economic account—that a worker is presumed
to understand and accept all risks of the work and that wages are
presumed to have been adjusted accordingly. But the formulation
tracks the parties’ cooperative motivations and accepts the
influence of external and internal norms.
Despite being extra-contractual, this formulation is largely
reflected in existing worker safety law. The Act’s general duty
clause obligates employers to provide “employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
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employees.”161 Nothing in the reasoning of Farwell would require
that a workplace be free from such recognized hazards; nor can the
general duty clause be attributed entirely to the existence of any
identified market failure. The general duty clause is the legal
manifestation of prevailing social (external) norms surrounding the
employment relationship.162
This formulation is also consistent with OSHA’s Hazard
Communication standard, which obligates an employer to disclose
Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) to employees to explain
existing scientific knowledge on the risks posed by exposure to
potentially hazardous substances in the workplace.163 The
relational account would go further, however, by imposing an
affirmative good faith duty on employers to investigate potential
hazards presented in their workplaces. Skeptics of the Hazard
Communication standard worry that it leaves employers (and
chemical manufacturers and suppliers) free to use and market
potentially hazardous substances without imposing any
affirmative duty to research the substances, and also allows
employers to withhold information about the chemical makeup of
substances under an assertion of trade secret protection.164 A

161. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2012). The Act’s general duty clause is both broader and
narrower than the common law duty. Broader, because the clause requires employers to
ensure that their workplaces are “free” from all “recognized hazards” if the hazards threaten
serious injury or death; in contrast, the common law required only that employers exercise
ordinary care (i.e., a negligence standard) in providing safe workplaces. See Miller, supra note
146, at 616. Narrower, because the clause imposes no obligation to eliminate unrecognized
hazards (regardless of the potential harm or the unreasonableness of failing to eliminate such
hazards) and no obligation to remove hazards that are likely to cause harm falling short of
serious physical harm or death. See id. at 617. The Restatement of Employment Law adopts
a negligence standard, setting out a duty “to provide a reasonably safe workplace, including
reasonably safe equipment . . . .” RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, § 4.05 (AM. LAW. INST.
2015).
162. Congress recognized that it would be impossible to speak with specificity to every
possible workplace hazard in a manner that would be universally applicable to employers,
given the infinite possible conditions of various workplaces. See infra note 171 and
accompanying text.
163. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(c) (2012).
164. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of Environmental Law to
Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1702 n.285 (2004);
Susan D. Carle, Note, A Hazardous Mix: Discretion to Disclose and Incentives to Suppress Under
OSHA’s Hazard Communication Standard, 97 YALE L.J. 581, 585 (1988). The absence of any
affirmative duty to investigate has made it difficult for OSHA to promulgate specific
standards identifying permissible exposure limits for individual substances. This led former
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relational account, built on recognition of cooperative
motivations, suggests that the Hazard Communication standard
should be strengthened.
Anti-opportunism ought to be recognized as a proper purpose
of the Act, whether that recognition is based on relational contract
theory or on an express recognition of quasi-fiduciary duties
inherent in the special relationship of employment. The corollaries
that flow from that recognition can help guide the further
development of workplace safety regulation, including the
resolution of disputes about the boundaries of occupational
safety regulation.165
V. ANTI-OPPORTUNISM AS A LIMITING PRINCIPLE:
RESOLVING THE SEAWORLD DILEMMA
Return to Judge Kavanaugh’s two questions in SeaWorld.166
When should we paternalistically decide that willing participants
in sports or entertainment activities must be protected from
themselves? And who decides whether the risk to participants is
too high? This Part provides answers to both questions, showing
that the anti-opportunism purpose of OSHA can function as a
limiting principle. Taking Judge Kavanaugh’s question about who
decides first, this Part contends that OSHA (in its enforcement role)
and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(OSHRC) (in its adjudicatory role) are well-positioned to police
relational opportunism in cases like SeaWorld because they have the
technical expertise to carefully evaluate the factual context of
individual employment relationships. Next, this Part examines the
enforcement and fact-finding in SeaWorld, with an eye toward facts
in the record demonstrating relational opportunism. This Part then

OSHA Director David Michael to solicit the public for ideas about creative ways to address
OSHA’s recognized inability to effectively promulgate and update PELs. See also David
Michaels, Assistant Sec’y of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Request
for Information on Updating OSHA’s Chemical Permissible Exposure Limits (Oct. 9, 2014)
(transcript available at https://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?
p_table=SPEECHES&p_id=3313).
165. The anti-opportunism principle and relational contract theory may also have
important implications for resolving employee classification questions, considering the
propriety of deregulatory reforms, and questioning the wisdom of workers’ compensation
opt-out alternatives and other workers’ compensation reforms.
166. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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compares the findings of fact in SeaWorld to the NFL and NASCAR
hypotheticals, identifying potential distinctions. Finally, this Part
urges the creation of an affirmative defense that can help cabin
application of the general duty clause in inherently dangerous
occupations to only those cases involving relational opportunism.
A. OSHA’s Enforcement Structure
Judge Kavanaugh suggests that Congress, state legislators or
regulators, or federal or state courts applying tort law are more
appropriate entities to make determinations about restricting
inherently dangerous jobs.167 Congress, however, determined that
workplace safety concerns merited a federal response168 and that
OSHA and OSHRC should be delegated enforcement and
adjudicatory authority, respectively.169 The choice was an
appropriate and defensible one.
The Act’s general duty clause is strikingly broad, but it has
nonetheless withstood constitutional challenges based on its
vagueness.170 Congress included the general duty clause in the Act
based on its recognition that it would be impossible to develop
specific standards for every possible employment hazard.171
Congress presumably recognized that employment relationships
and their accompanying safety risks are too diverse to capture fully
in a comprehensive schedule of standards.

167. See supra note 11.
168. See Gross, supra note 144, at 249 (“Private industry and state regulation were not
doing an adequate job of insuring health and safety in the workplace.”).
169. See id. at 250–51.
170. Constitutional challenges to the Act’s general duty clause on the basis of
vagueness have been rejected by multiple federal courts of appeals. See Ensign-Bickford Co.
v. OSHRC, 717 F.2d 1419, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Bethlehem Steel v. OSHRC, 607 F.2d 871, 875
(3d Cir. 1979); Georgia Elec. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309, 322, n.32 (5th Cir. 1979); see also
Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 645 F.2d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that any problems
of fair notice under the general duty clause “dissipate when we read the clause as applying
when a reasonably prudent employer in the industry would have known that the proposed
method of abatement was required under the job conditions where the citation was issued.”).
171. See S. Rep. 91-1282 (Oct. 6, 1970), as reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5186;
Gross, supra note 144, at 253–54 (“The general duty clause is not a general substitute for
reliance on standards, but simply enables the Secretary of Labor to insure the protection of
employees who are working under special circumstances for which no standard has yet
been adopted.”).
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After considerable debate about the Secretary of Labor’s role,
Congress ultimately decided on a split-enforcement model.172 It
assigned only the prosecutorial function (including investigation,
issuance of citations, and assessing penalties) to the Secretary of
Labor, which exercises this authority through its designee,
OSHA.173 The authority to adjudicate citations is assigned to a
separate agency, OSHRC, which acts as an impartial arbiter when
employers challenge OSHA citations.174
OSHA enforces the general duty clause through case-by-case
adjudication.175 Due to the residual nature of the general duty
clause, any determination by OSHA to execute its prosecutorial
function by citing employers for its violation will require highly
fact-specific judgments by OSHA. But this appears to have been
fully understood by Congress.176 And it is a defensible choice. As
Jay Feinman notes, a relational approach to interpreting parties’
obligations is “contextual with a vengeance.”177 He writes that such
a relational analysis requires “immersing itself in the facts of the
172. See Gross, supra note 144, at 250–51; George Robert Johnson, Jr., The SplitEnforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV.
315, 315 (1987) (“[The Act] adopted a relatively novel and seldom-used feature in federal
administrative practice—the split-enforcement model for agency adjudications.”).
173. See 29 U.S.C. 658-59, 666 (2012); Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 147, 151 (1991) (“If
the Secretary (or the Secretary’s designate) determines upon investigation that an employer
is failing to comply with such a standard, the Secretary is authorized to issue a citation and
to assess the employer a monetary penalty.”); N.Y. State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor,
88 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1996).
174. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 474 U.S. 3, 7 (1985). Although a
neutral arbiter, the OSHRC owes a duty to actively and affirmatively protect the public. See
Brennan v. OSHRC, 492 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965)) (comparing the OSHRC to the Federal Power
Commission and noting that its role “as representative of the public interest ‘does not permit
it to act as an umpire blandly calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the
right of the public must receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the
Commission.’”).
175. See Puffer’s Hardware, Inc. v. Donovan, 742 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1984).
176. Congressman William Hathaway drew a comparison between OSHA enforcing
the general duty clause and the police making initial determinations about criminal
violations:
[It has been said that] it would be up to an inspector to decide what the general
duty was. I suppose that is true; it is up to the policeman to decide in the first
instance whether or not we have broken a law, too, but we do have resort to the
courts . . . . And hopefully, after a while, a body of law could be formulated so that
later cases would have precedents behind them . . . .
116 Cong. Rec. 10631 (daily ed. Nov. 23, 1970) (statement of Rep. William Hathaway); see
Gross, supra note 144, at 267–68.
177. See Feinman, supra note 57, at 742.

410

001.BENT_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

365

2/14/20 1:49 PM

OSHA, the Opportunism Police

particular contract and of the contexts from which it arises.”178 For
such a specialized, highly-contextual, fact-specific analysis,
administrative enforcement and adjudication in a specialized
quasi-judicial forum makes sense.179
Despite Judge Kavanaugh’s misgivings, Congress delegated to
OSHA the enforcement function and to OSHRC the adjudicative
function for fact-finding and determinations of general duty clause
violations. This reflects a Congressional judgment to vest these
powers, subject to judicial review, with OSHA and OSHRC, in
recognition of their expertise in dealing with the infinite variety of
employment relationships and threats to workplace safety. In the
Act, Congress defensibly answered the question of who decides that
the risks to employees are too high—OSHA and OSHRC.
B. Relational Opportunism in SeaWorld
Evidence of extra-contractual internal norms and indications of
opportunism permeate the factual record in SeaWorld. OSHA’s
issuance of the general duty citation and proposed abatement,
along with OSHA’s defense of its actions in litigation before
OSHRC and the D.C. Circuit, reveal that OSHA was acting as an
effective check on the employer’s opportunistic behavior. The
record reveals that SeaWorld was acting opportunistically by
exposing trainers to preventable but known and unpredictable
risks, while minimizing and mischaracterizing those risks to the
trainers. The record also supports the conclusion that SeaWorld
was shifting to trainers the responsibility to ensure that the
workplace was adequately safe. To view the employment
relationship in its full context requires careful attention to the
factual record.
SeaWorld relied on its trainers to engage in what SeaWorld
termed “operant conditioning” of the orcas and to recognize signs
of any abnormal behavior.180 Operant conditioning involved

178. See id.
179. See generally Gross, supra note 144, at 260 (“In fact, next to the Tax Court of the
United States and the United States Court of Military Appeals, [the OSHRC] is the closest
approximation to a court existing in the executive branch.”).
180. See Final Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor at 30–31, SeaWorld of Florida,
LLC v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1375). The D.C. Circuit majority noted
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trainers offering the whale positive reinforcement for desirable
behavior, ignoring (offering no reward for) undesirable behavior,
and recognizing any “precursors” or cues that the whale may not
be behaving as expected.181 SeaWorld then kept incident reports on
abnormal behavior exhibited by the orcas, though a SeaWorld
witness admitted that SeaWorld failed to document “a few”
incidents.182 SeaWorld and other marine parks having a
relationship with SeaWorld had experienced three prior human
deaths in connection with orca whales, as well as several physical
injuries and close calls.183 SeaWorld’s management relied primarily
on information provided by the employees themselves to
determine whether conditions were safe.184
The record contained significant evidence of internal norms
specific to trainers’ employment relationship that likely influenced
trainers’ relational expectations. Trainers were required to sign a
waiver-like document acknowledging the “inherent risks” in the
job and indicating that they agreed to tell a supervisor if they
became uncomfortable with taking “the calculated risks.”185
But SeaWorld characterized these risks as both controllable and
predictable, through corporate documents and culture. One of the
trainers’ manuals provided: “While the potential for serious
physical injuries exists, if trainers maintain top physical condition,
and adhere to safety and departmental procedures, the potential for
injury is dramatically reduced.”186 This was driven home by a
culture that cultivated a false “mythology among the trainers that
they have a deep understanding of the whales.”187 SeaWorld’s
training and discussion of orca behavior, including likening it to the
ability to read or predict the behavior of horses or dogs, may

that SeaWorld’s “operant conditioning” measures and safety protocols did not make the
orcas “safe,” but rather “demonstrate[d] SeaWorld’s recognition that the killer whales
interacting with trainers are dangerous and unpredictable.” SeaWorld of Florida, LLC v.
Perez, 748 F.3d 1202, 1209 (2014).
181. SeaWorld of Florida, 2012 WL 3019734, at *4.
182. Id. at *18.
183. Id. at *14–15, *17–18. One of these three prior deaths was not a trainer, but an
individual who stayed in the park after hours and entered Tilikum’s pool. It is not known
whether Tilikum played a role in his death. Id.
184. Final Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, supra note 180, at 30–31.
185. SeaWorld of Florida, 2012 WL 3019734, at *16.
186. Id.
187. Final Brief for Respondent Secretary of Labor, supra note 180, at 18.
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have led trainers to misunderstand the real, inevitable, and
ultimately non-controllable and unpredictable risks posed by orcas
in captivity.188
The ALJ cited an example that highlights the true relational
expectations of the parties. On incident report forms, one standard
question was whether the acts of the employee (trainer) contributed
to the accident. A trainer comment circulated in response to an
incident suggested that this form question was unnecessary,
because the answer was always yes:
Since we condition all aspects of the behavior and the behavior
broke down then we do contribute to the incident. I also seem to
remember that we discussed this and said that since the answer is
always yes that we would drop this from future incident reports
and just assume it as such.189

As the ALJ observed, this revealed the culture that SeaWorld
cultivated: “All behavior is thus predictable. . . . [I]njuries sustained
by a trainer will always be traceable to human error. It is not the
operant conditioning program that is inadequate; it is the
performance of the trainer that is flawed.”190
SeaWorld’s stated policies also conflicted with the reality of the
employment relationship in a way that parallels Barnes, discussed
above. In Barnes, employees often rode the gravel train with the
consent of the railroad, in an effort to save time and be more
productive—seemingly demonstrating a cooperative motivation.
Only after Barnes’ injury did the railroad opportunistically claim
that he should have waited for a passenger car, and that by riding
the gravel train he did so at his own risk. Likewise, the ALJ found
that SeaWorld had an “expectation that [trainers] will continue
with the show performance regardless of the precursors
demonstrated by the killer whales.”191 The ALJ continued,
“Although SeaWorld’s official stance is that trainers have the
option to end a show if they feel uncomfortable with the situation,
the reality is SeaWorld discourages such action.”192 SeaWorld
engaged in “a form of Monday morning quarterbacking,” by
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See id.
SeaWorld of Florida, 2012 WL 3019734, at *25.
Id. at *26.
Id. at *27.
Id. at **27–28 (citing critiques of trainers who cut performances short).

413

001.BENT_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/14/20 1:49 PM

2019

“second-guessing” their actions and invariably identifying a trainer
error that contributed to the incident.193
In its investigation and prosecution of the general duty clause
violation, OSHA was in a position to get a complete picture of the
SeaWorld trainers’ relationship with their employer, in the context
of all the external and internal norms that shaped that relationship.
OSHA pinpointed opportunistic behavior, and the OSHRC ALJ,
acting as neutral arbiter of the citation, cited evidence of that
opportunistic behavior in affirming the citation. SeaWorld did not
live up to the relational expectations of its trainers, and OSHA was
well-positioned to recognize that. Far from acting as if it had quasifiduciary duties to its employees, SeaWorld appears to have
intentionally and opportunistically instilled a culture that
misleadingly suggested that operant conditioning rendered the
workplace safe, despite formalistic disclaimers. If OSHA regulation
can be justified by an anti-opportunism purpose, then the citation
and proposed abatement in SeaWorld were appropriate.
C. NASCAR and the NFL
Judge Kavanaugh saw no principled distinction between the
proposed abatement in SeaWorld and banning tackling in the NFL
or setting speed limits in NASCAR races. But by examining the
available evidence of internal norms in the relevant employment
relationships, distinctions from SeaWorld emerge. This subpart
considers those distinctions.
NASCAR is the easier case.194 Over the years since the first
“Strictly Stock” race in 1949, NASCAR has introduced a number of
features designed to make stock car racing safer.195 These include,
inter alia, six-point restraint systems, body panel specifications,
frame enhancements, roll cages, roof flaps, and impact-absorbing

193. Id. at *28.
194. Set aside for purposes of this discussion the question whether NASCAR drivers
are employees or independent contractors. NASCAR maintains that its drivers are
independent contractors. See Steven Cole Smith, How the NFL’s Hidden Scourge Threatens
NASCAR Drivers, ROAD & TRACK (Jan. 31, 2014), http://www.roadandtrack.com/carculture/a6253/slipping-away-65-6-roa0214/.
195. See generally Mark Aumann, Safety Improvements, Changes Define Racing Eras,
NASCAR.COM (Feb. 16, 2011), https://www.nascar.com/en_us/news-media/articles/
2011/02/16/nascar-safety-history.html.
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track walls.196 But there does not appear to be publicly available
concrete allegations or evidence that NASCAR acted
opportunistically—contrary to the relational expectations of the
drivers. For example, my research uncovered no evidence that
NASCAR has been accused of hiding evidence of risks of injury or
death from high-speed collisions. Although chronic traumatic
encephalopathy (CTE) is now on NASCAR’s (and drivers’) radar,197
I have uncovered no concrete allegation (unlike in SeaWorld or in
litigation against the NFL) that NASCAR unreasonably
mischaracterized or failed to investigate or disclose evidence of any
connection between racing crashes and the development of CTE.
If NASCAR had indeed acted contrary to the relational
expectations of the parties—including by breaching a fiduciary
obligation to reasonably investigate and disclose any risks of stock
car racing—then an OSHA general duty clause citation and
abatement might well have been appropriate.198 But without any
such indication, Judge Kavanaugh’s comparison of NASCAR
drivers to the position of SeaWorld’s orca trainers, as revealed by
the factual record in the OSHRC proceedings, is unconvincing.
The NFL hypothetical advanced by Judge Kavanaugh is more
complex. For NFL players, there appears to be an important
distinction between current and former players. Several former
players have specifically alleged in litigation that the league was
aware of research on the long-term effects of repeated head trauma
caused by tackling on the brain, yet intentionally concealed that

196. See NASCAR Safety Improvements, FOX SPORTS (Oct. 20, 2016, 4:52 PM),
https://www.foxsports.com/nascar/gallery/nascar-safety-improvements-060614.
197. See Smith, supra note 194; see also Concussions in NASCAR Gain Drivers’ Attention,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/sports/nascaracknowledges-risk-and-dangers-of-drivers-concussions.html; Ken Willis, NASCAR and
Concussions: An Old Problem, a New Concern, GATEHOUSE MEDIA, http://gatehousenews.
com/nascarconcussion/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2019).
198. See supra Part IV.C. (discussing the anti-opportunism corollaries B. and C.); see also
Plaintiffs’ Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, Maxwell v. NFL, No.
BC465842, (Cal. Super. July 19, 2011), 2011 WL 2834814. Again, for purposes of this
discussion I will assume that NASCAR drivers are protected by OSHA. See supra note 194.
Another hurdle for an OSHA citation of NASCAR is that any ordered abatement must be
feasible, and speed limits may fail this test if they would fundamentally alter the nature
of the product. A similar argument was made and rejected in SeaWorld. 748 F.3d 1202,
1215 (2014).
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information from players.199 A class of retired NFL players sued the
league, and a settlement fund, including payouts of up to $5 million
per participating class member, has been approved.200 In the case of
those former players, the NFL may well have been operating in
violation of the general duty clause, interpreted as an instrument of
anti-opportunism.
But for current NFL players who joined the league after
widespread reports about CTE concerns, the situation is different.
Their relational exchanges look different, because the internal and
external norms have changed, as well as the NFL’s behavior. The
NFL has pledged to fund further scientific research into CTE and
the potential connection to head trauma resulting from tackle
football.201 The NFL has also instituted a number of rule
changes designed to reduce the risk.202 These steps alone might
not be enough to show that the NFL has not acted opportunistically
with regard to current players; but the contextual facts shaping
current players’ relational expectations certainly differ
significantly from those that faced retired players.203 On the
evidence now publicly available, current players appear to have a
weaker case (with respect to them) that the NFL engaged in
opportunistic, self-interested behavior that ran contrary to their
relational expectations.204

199. See In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., No. 2:12-md02323-AB, 2019 WL 95917 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2019). Similar concussion litigation has been filed
by former National Hockey League (NHL) players. See In re Nat’l Hockey League Players’
Concussion Injury Litig., MDL No. 14–2551, 2017 WL 3141921 (D. Minn. July 24, 2017).
200. See In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 2019 WL 95917. A
final class settlement was approved by the district court, as amended, on May 11, 2015, and
became effective following appeals on January 7, 2017. The settlement includes payment for
medical monitoring and monetary awards for certain diagnoses, including CTE, Alzheimer’s
Disease, ALS, Parkinson’s Disease, and dementia. See NFL CONCUSSION SETTLEMENT,
www.nflconcussionsettlement.com (last visited February 25, 2018).
201. NFL Issues Response to CTE Research Report, NFL, http://www.nfl.com/news
/story/0ap3000000822159/article/nfl-issues-response-to-cte-research-report (last updated
July 26, 12:02 PM).
202. Id.
203. Bill Bradley, Richard Sherman: NFL Players Are Aware of Risks of Playing Football,
NFL, http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap2000000268627/article/richard-sherman-nflplayers-are-aware-of-risks-of-playing-football (last updated Oct. 24, 2013, 12:24 PM) (“The
players before us took that risk too, but they still sued the league because they felt like they
were lied to about the long-term risks. Today, we’re fully educating guys on the risks and
we’re still playing. We have not hidden from the facts.”).
204. See id.
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D. A Proposed Affirmative Defense
Applying relational insights to the SeaWorld case and the NFL
and NASCAR hypotheticals suggests the creation of a doctrinal
affirmative defense to an OSHA general duty clause citation. The
affirmative defense would be based on the anti-opportunism
corollaries identified above205 and would be designed to cabin
OSHA citations to only those cases involving employers who act
contrary to the relational expectations of the parties to the
employment exchange. An employer in an industry that involves
inherent danger could successfully defend against an OSHA
general duty clause citation and abatement order by demonstrating
both of the following two elements:
(1) the occupation involves necessary health or safety risks,
the elimination of which is not possible without
changing the essence of the business; and
(2) the employer has met its fiduciary obligations to (a)
reasonably investigate the health and safety risks posed
by the occupation, and (b) disclose all relevant
information about the health and safety risks to
employees and prospective employees, including
warning of any specific, nonobvious or complex risks.
This affirmative defense would provide a safe harbor for certain
professional sports, entertainment, law enforcement, emergency
response, and other occupations in which some level of risk is
inherent and unavoidable. It would also permit context-specific
analysis of the unique risks posed in a variety of employment
exchanges, potentially including NASCAR, the NFL, and other
contact professional sports. Yet, a finding that an occupation
contains some level of inherent risk would not alone be sufficient
to avoid citation. Rather, the employer must affirmatively
demonstrate that it has not acted opportunistically with respect to
those risks. This required showing could provide the distinction
that Judge Kavanaugh seeks between the factual record in SeaWorld
(and perhaps former NFL players) and the situation for current
NASCAR drivers and NFL players. The narrowly limited nature of
205. See supra Part IV.C. (specifically, Corollaries A.–C.).
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this affirmative defense would serve the Act’s purposes by
protecting employees from precisely the sort of opportunistic
behavior by employers that was found by the ALJ in SeaWorld.206
VI. CONCLUSION
The search continues for the overarching purpose(s) of
employment law, as a field distinct from contract and tort law.
Employment contracts are not discrete bargains, and utility
maximization is not the sole motivation for the parties. Cooperative
motivations also drive the exchange and must be considered when
identifying the justifications for employment regulation. Relational
contract theory suggests that anti-opportunism is an important
justification for market interventions that regulate the employment
relationship. This anti-opportunism purpose has been
underappreciated in the employment law scholarship generally,
and has not been given sustained consideration in the specific
context of worker safety regulation under the Act.
In this Article, I have attempted to show that the antiopportunism principle can answer both of Judge Kavanaugh’s
questions. If anti-opportunism is a proper purpose of the Act, then
it can justify workplace safety regulations in a broader set of cases
than previously recognized, but also serve as a limiting principle to
guide enforcement of the Act’s admittedly broad general duty
clause. The anti-opportunism principle has the potential to answer
fundamental questions about the appropriateness of market
interventions in inherently dangerous jobs. And the antiopportunism principle can also explain Congress’ decision to
delegate enforcement and adjudicatory authority over such
difficult questions to OSHA and OSHRC, respectively.
Relational contract theory and the principle of antiopportunism hold promise for bringing a degree of order to the
mishmash of employment law. The implications likely extend
beyond worker safety regulation to questions of employee
classification, the possibility of reciprocal fiduciary (or quasifiduciary) duties of loyalty, employee privacy rights, workers’
compensation reforms, and the wide variety of common law and

206. See supra Section V.B.
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statutory limitations on the employment at-will rule. Such
questions are ripe for further scholarly exploration.
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